(1.) THE respondent in this appeal was employed as a clerk in the southern railway. During the year 1950, he was required to do the duties of a store van clerk in a goods train. A store van clerk is usually put in charge of about le wagons of a train. The respondent was, as a part of his duties, to collect empty gunny bags from the stations, and deliver them at the destination. On 6-4-1950, the respondent unloaded about 300 gunny bags at a way side station, according to him. under a mistaken impression that they were in excess of the quantity which should be taken by him to the destination. A charge was framed against him on 64-1950 by the District Controller of Stores, Perambur, of having attempted to sell 300 empty gunny bags out of those collected by him from the various stations while on duty, and he was called upon to show cause why he should not be removed from service or otherwise dealt with. On 8-5-1950, he was placed under suspension. On 16-5-1950, he submitted an explanation, protesting his innocence, and praying for a confronted enquiry. By his letter dated 7-6-1950, the District controller of Stores declined to hold a confronted enquiry, but stated that he was prepared to grant the respondent an Interview. The respondent had the interview with the officer on 14-6-1950. On the following day, the General Manager passed the following order.
(2.) IN this appeal it is contended on behalf of the appellant that the order dated 15-6-1950, terminating the services of the respondent, should be held to be only one under Rule 148 (3) and not by way of punishment,. It is not seriously disputed that, if it were to he held that the termination of the services of the respondent was by way of punishment the proceedings leading upto it were illegal, in that no reasonable opportunity was given to the respondent to prove his innocence.
(3.) THE first paragraph of the order dated 15-6-1950 does certainly show that the railway administration was satisfied that the respondent was guilty of the offence charged with. It is also clear that, but for that conclusion, the services of the respondent would not have been terminated. But it is contended that although the authorities might have referred to what, in their opinion, the respondent was guilty of, the actual action taken was only under rule 148 (3) and it was therefore not one by way of punishment.