GOPAL UDAYAR Vs. MANGALA UDAYAR AND ANR.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE plaintiff is the petitioner. The suit promissory note was assigned to him by the original payee. This promissory note had been executed on 3rd August, 1950 and there were two endorsements of payment dated 16th November, 1952 and 1st July, 1955. The question that was considered by the learned District Munsif was whether the suit was in time. This question had necessarily to be considered in the light of the provisions of Act I of 1955. The learned District Munsif thought that Article 74 of the Limitation Act could not cover the plaintiff's claim since the promissory note itself did not provide for payment of the amount in instalments. On this short ground the claim was dismissed.

(2.) THE question that I have now to consider is whether by reason of the special provisions in Act I of 1955 the plaintiff is entitled to sue in respect of the instalments which have fallen due and which have not been paid by the defendant -respondents. Under Act I of 1955 which came into force on 1st March, 1955, there was a clear bar of suit for the recovery of a debt before the expiry of four months from the commencement of the Act. Section 4 of the Act (in so far as it is material) also provided that notwithstanding any law, custom, contract or decree of Court to the contrary an agriculturist shall be entitled to pay the amount due in four equal instalments, the first instalment within 4 months of the commencement of the Act, and the remaining instalments on or before the 1st of July of each of the succeeding three years. What happened in this case was that by operation of this provision the debtor became entitled to pay the amount only in such instalments as provided. It obviously follows that the creditor could not claim to be paid contrary to this provision. It is conceded by the plaintiff that on the suit as laid by him the first instalment which was payable on 1st July, 1955, had become barred by time, and that it is only the three subsequent instalments that would be within time. In putting forward this argument the learned Counsel for the petitioner claims that this special enactment which replaces the contract between the parties and provides for instalment payment in the manner specified gives rise to a cause of action in favour of the plaintiff -creditor in respect of each instalment, that is to say, the creditor would have a period of three years within which to file a suit in respect of that particular instalment which the debtor had failed to pay on the due date. If that contention is accepted there is no doubt that the suit must be held to be within time. Before I deal with that point I may refer to the other argument that Article 74 of the Limitation Act does not apply in this case.

(3.) IN Sambayya v. Pedda Subbayya : AIR1938Mad19 , the question arose whether the period of limitation should stand extended by the period that intervened between the adjudication and the subsequent instalment. It was held that this period could be deducted, the principal basis for the decision being that the statute of limitation must be read side by side with the other enactments which affect the period of limitation. Except for the broad principle that the law of limitation does not stand by itself, it is not necessary to refer to this decision any further.