K PERUMAL CHETTIAR Vs. V MUTHUSWAMI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS civil revision petition has been posted be-fore this Full Bench in view of the challenge made to the correctness of the decision reported in Sita ramanjaneyulu v. Krishnayya, The subject matter of this revision petition relates to certain proceedings initiated by the respondent-landlord for eviction of the petitioner under the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,. XXV of 1949. Even earlier, that is on i-2-i9s5,-the respondent had filed a petition, H. R. C. No. 35, of 1955, for a similar relief before the Rent Controller, Tiruchirapalli, the ground alleged being that the tenant had defaulted in payment of rent and had sublet the building which according to him was also required for personal occupation. That application was dismissed by the rent Controller. An appeal from that order proved fruitless. The respondent questioned the correctness of that order under S. 12-B of the Act in C. R. P. No. 15 of 1957 on the file of the District Court, Tiruchirapalli, which also met with a similar fate. That was 30-12-1958. While the revision petition was pending before the District Judge, that is, On 20-81958, the respondent filed H. R. C. No. 283 of 1958 (out of which the revision petition before us arises) for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that he was guilty of further default in the payment of rent, in that he was in arrears from 182-1957 to 18-7-1958, a period subsequent to the filing of the previous petition. Another ground, namely, the need for personal occupation, was also mentioned. The courts below have accepted the came of the respondent and ordered eviction. That order is contested before us on the short ground that the filing of the second petition for eviction on the grounds stated, even while the earlier petition for similar relief was pending adjudication before the court of revision, is not authorised by law and that therefore the lower courts had no jurisdiction to order eviction. The contention is based solely on the terms of S. 7 (6) of the Act which runs:

(2.) WE are of opinion that the terms of Sec. 7 (6) do not warrant such a construction. That sub-section specifically states that the tenancy which is deemed to continue thereunder will be terminable by the landlord on the grounds specified in sub-secs. (2) and (3 ). There are no words in the section to prevent the landlord founding a second petition for eviction on the basis of a de-fault in the payment of rent which occurs subsequent to the filing of the first petition. Further, there may also arise cases where subsequent to the earlier petition but during the pendency of it, a need arises for the landlord to obtain the building for personal occupation or there may be cases where the tenant unauthorisedly sublets the premises or commits waste or nuisance. It cannot be denied that the landlord must in justice be able to obtain relief in such cases. To say such a right would be lost merely because an ill-founded earlier petition was pending will require much clearer language in Sec. 7 (6 ).

(3.) THE Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, is an enactment which restricts the ordinary rights of landlord and tenant arising out of their mutual contracts and relationship; it undoubtedly affects their proprietary rights. The provisions of the Act have therefore to be strictly construed. Section 7 (6) itself only creates a fiction as to the continuation of the tenancy the purpose of it being to enable the tenant to continue in possession on the same terms as before, and not to be bound by intermediate stipulations which he might have entered into with the landlord during the pendency of the petition. While enacting such a fiction the legislature safeguards also the landlord's right by preserving to him the right created under sub-secs. (2) and (3 ). It will be an unwarranted extension of the fiction to hold that while on the dismissal of an application for eviction the tenant is restored to his original position, the landlord should be at a disadvantage by not being able to rely on defaults or necessities which arise subsequent to the filing of the previous application but before its termination. If that were so, the consequence would be that so long as, what is ultimately found to be an ill-founded petition by a landlord for eviction of his tenant, is pending (whether before the Rent Controller or the appellate authority or court of revision) or so long as he is able to delay final disposal thereof, the tenant could with impunity commit defaults in payment of rent incurring no penalty therefor; even immediate and dire necessity for personal occupation by the former or open and hostile acts of waste or nuisance by a disgruntled tenant would also go without a remedy. Such a construction of S. 7 (6) would have also the effect of defeating the express and mandatory provisions of S. 7 (2) and (3) which oblige the Rent Controller to pass an order for eviction when once, one of the justifying grounds is proved to exist.