A NATESA ASARI Vs. STATE OF MADRAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) We have already held that the acquisitions are for a public purpose and that therefore they are not open to objection under Article 31(2) of the Constitution. It is now argued Before us that the acquisitions are in contravention of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) and that therefore they are invalid. Two objections have been put forward on this score. One is that the petitioners had no opportunity to prefer objections under Section 5-A of the Act. To understand the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, it is necessary to set out in brief the scheme of the Act. Under Section 4 a preliminary notification is made for the acquisition of the property for any public purpose. Under Section 5-A objections are heard and then the final order is passed under Section 6. Thereafter notice to all the persons is given under Section 9 and after enquiry is held, an awards passed under Section 16. On the making of an award under Section 16, the property vests absolutely in the Government. There are two exceptions to this procedure provided in Section 17. We are concerned only with one of them Section 17(1). That provides that in cases of urgency, the Collector may even before the making of an award, take possession of the property within 15 days of the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9. Tne contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the power under Section 17(1) could be invoked only after the stage has been reached when notices are issued under Section 9 which must itself be only after hearing objections under Section 5-A. So far, we agree.

(2.) It is necessary now to refer to Section 17(4) which is the relevant provision. It runs as follows:

(3.) But Mr. Rajah Aiyar relies on the fact that Section 17(4) refers to the provisions of Sub-section (1) & argues that by implication it must be taken that the powers under Section 17(4) could be exercised only after objections are heard under Section 5-A and notices are issued under Section 9. This argument is against the express language of Sub-section (4) which clearly enacts that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply in case of orders under that sub-section. To adopt the construction contended for by Mr. Rajah Aiyar will be to render Sub-section (4) wholly nugatory. What all is required under Section 17(4) is that the Government must be satisfied that there is such urgency as is contemplated by Section 17(1). If they are so satisfied, they are entitled to pass an order under Section 17(4) suspending the application of Section 5-A and that is what has been done in this case. Mr. Rajah Aiyar also suggested that there was no such urgency as would justify involving the powers under Section 17(1) and that there was no inquiry about any such urgency. We are of opinion that whether an urgency exists or not is a matter solely for the determination of the Government and it is not a matter for judicial review. This objection is accordingly overruled.