BOGGRAPU VENKATASUBBIAH Vs. CHENCHUPALLI PEERIAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These appeals arise out of a suit Instituted by the plaintiff for a declaration that certain sales in execution of an award by a Cooperative Society are invalid. The award was passed in 1931. Some amounts were realised through the agency of the Collector in 1934 and an execution application was filed in 1936. There were sales of certain properties which on objection was set aside. There was a direction for resale of the items already brought to sale and also two other items being mortgaged properties which were originally not brought to sale. These items were again put up for sale in 1934. The sales were confirmed by the Department and the objections filed by the judgment-debtor were disallowed. He took the matter to the higher officials. That was also dismissed. Finally he brought the present suit. The lower appellate Court has now found that there were certain irregularities in the conduct of the sale and there has been an injury caused to the plaintiff because the price realised was inadequate. The lower appellate Court decreed the suit holding that the civil Courts had Jurisdiction to decide the matter. The second appeals are now filed questioning the correctness of the decision of the lower appellate Court which had reversed the decree of the trial Court.

(2.) The point argued in second appeal is that the civil Court has no Jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on a Bench decision in 'Ramayya v. Chittoor District Cooperative Deputy Registrar, ILR (1946) Mad 330. The lower appellate Court tried to distinguish the decision but in my opinion, the attempted distinction is not tenable. The lower appellate Court thought that this decision should be confined to cases where liability sought to be enforced was created under the Act or by virtue of some section of the Act. It cannot govern the case like the present one, where the liability arose under the contract. I do not think that this distinction is supportable. It would follow that the civil Courts have no Jurisdiction.

(3.) Mr. Umamaheswaram, however, contended that that decision of the Bench should in any event be confined to cases only where the sales were attacked on grounds of fraud or irregularities in the conduct of the sale. But where as in the present case, the sales ate attacked on the ground of illegality the civil Courts can go into the matter. Having regard to the reasoning of the Bench I am not satisfied that this distinction could be made. The Co-operative Societies Act itself provides for the higher authorities of the department setting aside the sales "on any ground" and there is also the power of revision to the local Government for which even a long period of about a year has been provided for. The powers of interference do not seem to be confined to cases where there has been a fraud or irregularity only. They are wide enough to include cases where the sale is vitiated by what may be called irregularity as distinguished from mere illegality. I cannot, therefore, say that the distinction, which was sought to be drawn by Mr. Umamaheswaram, necessarily follows.