CHINNUPATI BAPAYYA VARMA Vs. THOTAKURU SITARAMAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The suit out of which this petition has arisen was filed by the petitioner in this Court to recover a sum of Rs. 155-12-0 from the defendants by way of contribution. The defendants are the respondents in this petition. A third party obtained a joint and several decree for costs against the present plaintiff-petitioner and some other persons who figured as defendants in the suit filed against the present petitioner and some third parties as well, in A. S. No. 12 of 1944 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tenali. In satisfaction of that decree the plaintiff deposited into Court a sum of Rs. 198 on 25-2-1S46. Thereafter the petitioner sued the rest of the judgment-debtors who are the defendants in the suit for contribution. Defendant 1, subsequent to the suit is said to have paid his share to the plaintiff with the result that his share of the liability was no longer in dispute and he was exonerated. Defendants 2 and 3 remained ex parte; and defendants 4 to 8 alone contested the plaintiff's claim for contribution. Several of the points taken by the respondents in this petition in the lower Court were not very material except the one which raised the question of limitation. The respondents' contention was that inasmuch as the payment was made on 25-3-1946, the suit must be considered to have been out of time in view of the provisions of Article 61 or Article 99, Limitation Act. This contention was upheld and the suit was dismissed.

(2.) The learned counsel for the petitioner while conceding that it may be Article 61 or Article 99 that may be applicable on the facts of this case, would urge that the real starting point for limitation to run would be not the date on which the payment was made or money was deposited in Court to the credit of the decree, but it would be on the date on which the money was appropriated towards the decree. In the course of his arguments he has referred to four such stages, the first stage being the payment of the money into Court, the second stage being the appropriation by the Court of the money so paid into Court towards the decree, the third stage being the withdrawal of the amount by the decree-holder and the fourth being the discharge of the judgment-debtors. He does not lay emphasis upon the first and third stages, namely, the payment of the money actually into Court or the date of the actual withdrawal of the money by the judgment-creditor. But he does not lay considerable stress on the date when the appropriation of the money deposited into Court takes place and also by reason of such appropriation the date on which the discharge of the judgment-debtors takes place. According to him the date on which appropriation is ordered by the Court of the amount paid into Court towards the decree will be the same as when the discharge of the Judgment-debtors takes place. A further point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the cause of action to the plaintiff who seeks contribution from the defendants judgment-debtors would be the date on which the defendants would derive benefit to themselves from out of the payment of the money into Court and that such benefit to the judgment-debtors would really arise on the date on which either the appropriation is made, or on the date on which satisfaction is entered up and not on the date on which payment is made into Court. In support of his contention he has invited my attention to a decision reported in - 'Pattabhi-ramayya Naidu v. Ramayya Naidu', 20 Mad 23 (A). In this case, the plea taken was that the suit was barred by limitation under Articles 61 and 99 of Schedule. II, Limitation Act on the ground that the suit was not brought until more than three years had elapsed from the realisation of the money from the plaintiffs by sale of their property by the Court. The learned Judges held that the words of Article 99 show that it cannot apply to a case like the one before them where on the facts not the whole but only a part of the money due under a joint decree was realised from the plaintiffs. This seems to me to be the main point that was decided in that suit. No doubt, the learned Judges proceeded further to observe

(3.) The learned counsel for the petitioner next proceeded to question the view of the learned Small Cause Judge in having applied the decision reported in -' Meghavarnam Naidu v. Muhammad Mohideen Sahib', AIR 1936 Mad 782 (D). in that decision Wadsworth J. held that time may run from the date of payment into Court and distinguished the decision in -- '20 Mad 23 (A)', and also in -- 'Gahar Ali Havaldar v. Abdul Owahab Shikdar', AIR 1928 Cal 361 (E). The learned Judge observed at p. 783 as follows: