M KALI MUDALIAR Vs. A VEDACHALA MUDALIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal against the judgment and order of Subba Rao J. quashing an order of the Government dated 5th July 1951 passed under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The first respondent before us was granted two stage carriage permits for the route from Vanangupet to Madras. The time fixed for starting the two buses, the one from Madras and the other from Vanangupet was 7 a.m. The appellant before us was granted a permit for the route between Vanangupet and Madhurantakam. The time fixed for starting of his bus was 8-5 a.m. The Regional Transport Authority on an application by the appellant changed the timings for his bus to 6-40 a.m. instead of 8-5 a.m. by his order dated 21st July 1950. Against this order, the first respondent herein preferred an appeal to the Central Road Traffic Board which restored the original timings. Thereupon the appellant preferred a revision to the Government under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Government set aside the order of the Central Road Traffic Board an^ restored the order of the Regional Transport Authority. There was an application to this Court for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Government and this Court allowed that application and quashed the order on the ground that the order on the face of it did not disclose why the Government passed' the order under Section 64-A. The appellant again moved the Government subsequent to the order of this Court and the Government once again set aside the Central Road Traffic Board's order and restored the order of the Regional Transport Authority. The first respondent again filed another application which came on before Subba Rao J. The learned Judge first heard and overruled a preliminary objection raised by the appellant to the maintainability of the application for a Writ of Certiorari based on the ground that the order of the Regional Transport Authority in fixing the timings was an administrative act and therefore the order of Central Road Traffic Board made on appeal and the order of the Government passed under Section 64-A in revision were also administrative orders not liable to be quashed by a Writ of Certiorari. The learned Judge then held that viewed as a judicial order, the order of the Government must be set aside because the Government had not assigned any reasons for their conclusion. His conclusion is stated thus: "In the present case the latest order of the Government is only a mechanical repetition of the words in Section 64-A of the Act. It is net a judicial determination of the conditions laid down in Section 64-A, which entitle them to interfere with the order of the subordinate authorities, I have, therefore, no alternative but to quash the order of the Government." In our opinion, the appeal must be allowed, but on a ground which apparently did not loom large before the learned Judge, though it can not be said that the point was not taken at all. It was contended by Mr. Bhashyam Aiyangar, for the appellant that an appeal from the order of the Regional Transport Authority changing the timings of his bus did not lie to the Central Road Traffic Board and therefore the Government by restoring the order of the Regional Transport Authority was in effect doing a proper thing, because the order of the Regional Transport Authority had become final. The only provision in the Motor Vehicles Act which confers a right of appeal in certain specified cases is Section 64. The question is whether the first respondent herein could be deemed to fall under any of the Clauses (a) to (g) of that section. The learned Judge (Subba Rao J.) was apparently inclined to take the view that he would fall within Clause (b), namely, any person "aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof." Before us Mr. Rangaswami Aiyangar for the first respondent suggested as an alternative Clause (f), which runs thus :

(2.) The material provisions of the Act which have any bearing on the question which falls for decision are Sections 46, 47, 48, 48-A and 59. Section 46 deals with an application for a stage carriage permit. It provides that such an application shall contain certain particulars. Mr. Rangaswami Aiyangar contended that all these particulars when incorporated in the permit would become conditions of the permit. We have no hesitation in rejecting this contention. One of the particulars which has to be mentioned in the application is the type of 'he vehicle in respect of which the application is made. Surely it cannot be contended that the mention of the particular type in the permit, would amount to imposing a condition in respect of the permit. Section 46 deals with the stage of an application by the owner of the vehicle and does not purport to deal with the conditions which may be imposed by the authority granting the permit. Section 47 prescribes the procedure which the Regional Transport Authority has to follow in considering applications for stage carriage permits. He is enjoined to have regard to certain matters and to take into consideration any representations made by persons already providing road transport facilities along or near the proposed route or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route may lie or by any association interested in the provision of road transport facilities. Under Section 47(2), the Regional Transport Authority is bound to refuse to grant a stage carriage permit if it appears from any time table furnished that the provisions of the Act relating to the speed at which vehicles may be driven are likely to be contravened. Section 48 confers certain powers on the Regional Trans port Authority. These powers are not all of the same nature and do not belong to the same category. The only common thing is that these powers are to be exercised in the interests of the public and to provide adequate transport facilities to the public. The powers conferred are, (a) the power to limit the number of stage carriages in any particular region or in any specified area or on any specified route, (b) the power to issue a stage carriage permit in respect of a particular stage carriage or a particular service of stage carriages, (c) the power to regulate timings of arrival or departure of stage carriages whether they belong to a single or more owners, (d) power to attach to a stage carriage permit any prescribed condition or any one or more of the conditions enumerated in Sub-clauses (i) to (vi) of Clause (d). The relevant Sub-clause is Sub-clause (iii) which runs as follows:

(3.) In exercise of the powers conferred on the Government rules have been framed under the Act. Rule 269 relates to the change of timings. It runs thus: