N BALARAMAN Vs. CORPORATION OF MADRAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This application is for issuing a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Corporation of Madras. The petitioner is the proprietor of the firewood depot situated at No. 69 Guruvappa Chetty Street, Chintadripet, Madras. On 2-2- 1951, the Commissioner of the Corporation refused to issue a license on the following grounds : (1) there is no space for loading and unloading inside the firewood depot; (2) the splitting is done on the road margin; and (3) there is no open space 20 feet all round in order to reduce fire risk. The petitioner appealed against that order to the Standing Committee (Health). The Standing Committee set aside the order of the Commissioner and directed the issue of the license. The Commissioner referred the matter to the council and the council passed a resolution on 11-9-1951 setting aside the sale (said?) order of the Standing Committee and restoring that of the Commissioner. The petitioner filed this application for setting aside that order on the ground that the order was arbitrary and also contrary to the principles of natural justice. The relevant sections of the Madras City Municipal Act are as follows :

(2.) It is clear from the aforesaid provisions that issuing an order or refusing to issue a license is of quasi-judicial nature and the Commissioner will have to comply with the provisions of the Act and also shall give reasons for his refusal. Against the order of refusal, a statutory right of appeal is given to the Standing Committee. If the order of the Standing Committee is against the view expressed by the Commissioner he can refer the matter to the Council whose order will be final. In this case, it is not disputed that the Council set aside the order of the Standing Com-mittee without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to put forward his case.

(3.) When a tribunal is entrusted with quasi- judicial functions affecting the rights of par ties, it is the elementary principle that the said tribunal should give an opportunity to the person affected to put forward his case. Any decision made by such a tribunal with out giving that opportunity is contrary to the principles of natural justice and is liable to be set aside. But the procedure which a tribunal is to follow depends upon the functions, the character and the administrative convenience of the tribunal. It is not possible to equate the council to a court of law, and insist upon that tribunal to follow and adopt the rules of judicial procedure adopted and followed by courts. It is hoped that the Corporation will evolve a procedure which will give a reasonable opportunity to a party affected to put forward his case. The order of the Corporation of Madras is hereby quash ed and they are directed to dispose of the reference in accordance with law. In this view, the other question does not arise for consideration. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs.