(1.) This case is thoroughly unarguable for we petitioner, Mr. Krishna Rao, however, has done his job neatly and fairly.
(2.) The material facts are these. There was a suit filed by the petitioner before me on 10-9-1948, and an attachment before judgment was then, and there obtained by him. On 2-12-1948 a decree followed and the Court made the attachment absolute. Then there was an execution petition filed on 7-12-1948 against certain money of the judgment-debtor lying to his credit with the I. L. T. D. Company at auntur. The Court on 9-12-1948 made an order in these terms "send for', apparently a compendious expression which the Court used for what might well have been 'send for the money attached." On 14-12-1948, five days after the order of the Court just mentioned, there was an insolvency petition presented against the judgment-debtor in this suit by a creditor of his. The question which arises for determination is whether the order of 9-12-1948 has the effect of bringing into operation the exception referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 51 of the Provincial Insolvency Act.
(3.) The question turns upon whether the amount which was sent for by the Court can be said to be in the nature of assets realised in the course of the execution within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 51 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. That the money was not in fact received by the Court by the date of the admission of the petition for adjudication of the Judgment-debtor as an Insolvent is not denied. What is urged is that according to the true meaning of the word "realised" hi Sub-section (1) of Section 51, such receipt is unnecessary. It is argued that the order of 9-12-1948 is itself tantamount to realisation although there was not even receipt of the money by the Court pursuant to its order and prior to the date of the admission of the petition for insolvency of the judgment-debtor. I cannot agree with this contention.