PROVINCE OF MADRAS Vs. CHEKKA SATYANARAYANAMURTHY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) All these three appeals raise the same question of law, though the respondents are different. The suits were filed by the respondents plaintiffs against the State of Madras alleging that sales-tax was illegally levied against them and excessive amounts were collected from them as sales-tax. Various defenses were raised in the trial Court of which one was that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suits. The District Munsiff found in favour of the defendant and dismissed all the suits. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge came to a contrary conclusion and remanded the suits for disposal on merits. Hence these appeals.

(2.) The only question is whether the Madras General Sales-tax Act, 1939, with its subsequent amendments has ousted the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Courts when a party is alleged to have been aggrieved by the administration of the Act. For this purpose it is necessary to refer to the relevant portions of the Act of which sections 11 and 12 are the most important. The earlier sections deal with the levy of sales-tax on various commodities and the method of levying the same. Section 11 lays down that an assesses objecting to an assessment made on him under the provisions of this Act, may, within thirty days from the date on which he was served with notice of assessment, appeal to such authority as may be prescribed. The appeal shall be in the prescribed form and shall be verified in the prescribed manner. The appellate authority may, after giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders on appeal as such authority may think fit. Sub-section (4) of Section 11 states that every order passed in appeal, under this section by the appellate authority shall, subject to the powers of revision conferred by the next section be final. Section 12 contemplates that the Revenue Board may, in its discretion, call for and examine the record of any order passed, or proceeding recorded, by any authority, officer or any person under the provisions of the Act, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of such proceeding, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. Both these sections therefore lay down that if a tax collecting authority levies sales-tax, any assessee aggrieved by such assessment is entitled to file an appeal to an appellate authority whose decision will be final subject to a revision by the Board of Revenue. In deciding the revision it is open to the Board to find out whether the order was legal or proper and whether the proceedings were regular. The powers conferred under Section 12 are more or less in the nature of the power conferred upon the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Sections 435 and 439 Criminal Procedure code. That is, the powers are sufficiently wide as to entitle the Board to interfere in suitable cases. Sections 17 and 18 are also relevant for the present controversy. Section 17 prohibits the filing of a suit, or prosecution, or other proceeding, against any officer or servant of the State Government for any act done of purporting to be done, under the Act, without the previous sanction of the State Government. Sub-section (2) says that no officer or servant of the State Government shall be liable in respect of any such act in any civil or criminal proceeding if the act was done in good faith in the course of the execution of duties or the discharge of functions imposed by or under the Act. section 18 reads as follows:

(3.) But the most important decision which has to be considered for the purpose of the present discussion is that of Varadachariar, J., in Kamaraja Pandia Naicker v. Secretary of State' 69 Mad L Jour 695. The learned Judge states the law as follows at page 700 of the report: