R.GOVINDASWAMI NAIDU Vs. G.PUSHPALAMMAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS application relates to the petitioner's occupation of house No. 7, Rama -krishna Street, G. T. Madras as a tenant under the respondent. He originally entered on the premises on or about 1 -11 -1944 and it is common ground that the premises were let to him for manufacturing peppermints. On 16 -1 -1950 the landlady issued a notice to the petitioner through her advocate calling upon him to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the house on the ground that ho had committed acts of waste. The acts mentioned in that notice were that he had demolished the wall of the inside room in the front yard and removed the threshold and doorway and converted the room into one big hall and that he had removed the rafters and inserted in their places bamboo sticks. The reply to this notice contained several matters not strictly pertaining to the disposal of the application before us, but it was alleged therein that the notice was not issued 'bona fide' as it was full of falsehoods, but it was issued maliciously with a view to extort money and blackmail him. As regards the charge about removal of the rafters, the tenant stated that it was at the instance of the landlady that he substituted bamboo rafters in place of rotten palmyra ones. He also alleged that the alterations and other necessary repairs were done by him with the consent and at the instance of the landlady. On 14 -2 -1950 the landlady filed a petition under Sections 7(2) and (3) of Madras Act XV of 1946 for eviction of the petitioner. The material portion of this petition is paragraph 7 in which it was alleged that without the knowledge and consent of the landlady er her husband, the tenant had demolished the wall of the inside room in the front compartment and removed the threshold and doorway and converted the room into a big hall and that he had further removed several rafters and inserted in their place bamboo sticks. In paragraph 8 it was stated that by reason of such demolition and alteration in the building the respondent had committed serious acts of waste which had materially impaired the value of the building. Before the Bent Controller the landlady's husband gave evidence as P. W. 1 and three witnesses were examined on behalf of the tenant. The Rent Controller also appears to have made an inspection of the premises in the presence of P. w. 1 and the respondent. The Bent Controller found that one wall which separated the western room from the main hall in the front yard of the suit building had been removed leaving only the wooden door frame intact. This finding of fact was also based upon the evidence of the landlady's busband and it must be accepted. There is no finding either of the Bent Controller or of the appellate tribunal as to the rafters. The Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the wall which had been demolished had also been to some extent a support to the tiled roof above. Apparently because of this he was satisfied that the tenant had by demolishing impaired materially the value and utility of the building. He therefore passed an order for eviction. There was an appeal by the tenant and the appellate tribunal dis -missed the appeal. The learned Judge held that there could be no dispute about the demolition of the wall. He concluded - - as did the Rent Controller - - that the wall must have been a sup -port to the roof above and its removal must amount to less protection for the roof which thereby would put the house in a dangerous condition. He was therefore of the opinion that the tenant was guilty of an act which impaired the value and utility of the building. The application now before us has been filed by the tenant to quash the orders of the Bent Controller and the appellate tribunal.

(2.) SEVERAL points were raised before us by Mr. Srinivasa Ayyangar, learned counsel for the tenant. The first point was that there is no definite finding that the act of waste alleged was done after the coming into force of Madras Act XV of 1946 and in the absence of such a finding the petition for eviction was not maintainable. It is true that there is no definite finding, but we do not wish to say anything further on this point as we think that the application must be heard and disposed of afresh in the view we are taking on another point.

(3.) IN the circumstances we do not think weshould sustain an order of eviction based upon afinding which cannot be deemed to be a properfinding in law. We therefore quash the orders ofthe Rent Controller and the appellate tribunalwith the result that the petition for eviction filedby the respondent will stand restored to the fileof the Rent Controller. The parties will be at libertyto adduce fresh evidence if they chose to. In thecircumstances of the case there will be no ordersas to costs.