KAJA MOHIDEEN Vs. HAMEED FATHIMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two second appeals arise out of a suit for recovery of possession and a suit for permanent injunction.

(2.) The suit property in both the suits is one and the same. O.S.No.2 of 1999 was filed by the respondents herein seeking the relief of permanent injunction restraining the original appellant herein from interfering with their possession and enjoyment of the suit property. O.S.No.604 of 1999 was filed by the original appellant for recovery of possession from the respondents. Both the suits were tried together. The first respondent herein examined himself as P.W.I and five other witnesses were examined on his side. Ex.A.I to Ex.A.13 were marked. The original appellant examined himself as D.W.I and three other witnesses were examined on his side. Ex.B.l to Ex.B.6 were marked. After a consideration of the evidence on record, the trial Court by judgment and decree dtd. 20/11/2001 dismissed O.S.No.2 of 1999 and allowed O.S.No.604 of 1999. Aggrieved by the same, the respondents herein filed A.S.No.113 of 2002 and A.S. No.121 of 2002 before the I Additional Sub Court, Tirunelveli. By the impugned judgment and decree dtd. 27/9/2002, the injunction suit was decreed and the suit for recovery of possession was dismissed. The original appellant had also filed cross appeal and that was also dismissed. Challenging the same, the present second appeals were filed and they were admitted on 25/7/2003 on the following substantial questions of law:-

(3.) During the pendency of the second appeals, the original appellant passed away and his legal representatives were brought on record. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that there is no dispute that the suit property belongs to the appellants. The first respondent herein was doing " Pandhal " business and he was permitted to stack his bamboos on the suit property. The suit propertywas permitted to be used during the festival occasion every year. During the festival period, the respondents were also allowed to put up a tea shop. The dispute however arose between the parties some time in the year 1998, when the original appellant wanted to put up a compound wall enclosing the suit property. The firm contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants is that the respondents were allowed to enjoy the suit property only as a licensee and that there was no lease arrangement between the parties at any point of time. The respondents ought to have surrendered the premises, the moment the license was revoked. There is no necessity to issue any formal notice of revocation. The institution of the suit itself can be construed as a notice of revocation. According to the appellants, the trial Court correctly approached the issues and the first appellate Court without any justification reversed the said decision. The conclusion of the first appellate Court is perverse. The learned counsel called upon this Court to answer the substantial questions of law in favour of the appellant and set aside the impugned judgment and decree and restore the decision of the trial Court.