LAWS(MAD)-2001-9-73

P THANGARAJ Vs. OOTHU ESTATE

Decided On September 18, 2001
P. THANGARAJ Appellant
V/S
OOTHU ESTATE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE appellant is aggrieved against the common order of the learned Single Judge, dated 14 July, 2000, passed in W.P. Nos. 1984 and 9385 of 1993. We are, however, concerned with the case of the appellant, was the petitioner in W.P. No. 9385 of 1993. THE appellant herein was an employee of the first respondent-Estate. THE appellant was stated to have been issued with a warning notice under Exhibit M1, dated 16 November, 1987, to the effect that he made certain illegal constructions in the land belonging to the first respondent-Estate and that he should demolish the same. Since the appellant refused to obey the directions of the first respondent-Estate, a show-cause notice under Exhibit M2, dated 13 December, 1988, came to be issued as to why action should not be taken against him for disobeying the orders of the management by virtue of Standing Orders 23(1) and 23(12). THE appellant contended that the construction in the land in question was put up by his father in the year 1950 with the permission of one Sri Hews the then Administrator of the first respondent-Estate, that when the said building got damaged he renovated the building by spending a sum of Rs. 7, 500 and that he would be able to demolish the said construction only if the first respondent reimburse the cost of the said building. Not satisfied with the explanation of the petitioner/appellant, a charge-sheet was issued to the appellant on 17 December, 1988 and thereafter, after holding a full-fledged enquiry and based on the findings of the enquiry officer, by order, dated 17 January, 1989, the appellant was dismissed from the services of the first respondent. Aggrieved against the order of dismissal, the appellant raised an industrial dispute before the second respondent which came to be numbered as I.D. No. 413 of 1989. By it's award, dated 29 December, 1993, the second respondent held that the non-employment of the appellant was not justified and directed reinstatement of the appellant with continuity of service and back-wages as prayed for by him. It is as against the said award of the second respondent, the first respondent preferred W.P. No. 9385 of 1993 which came to be allowed by the learned Single Judge by his order, dated 14 July, 2000. Learned Judge was pleased to set aside the award of the second respondent and thereby confirmed the order of dismissal, dated 17 January, 1989.Assailing the said order of the learned Single Judge Sri Mathi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that when the construction of the building, according to the appellant, was permitted to be made by the then Administrator of the first respondent as early as in the year 1950 and when the appellant made certain improvements in the said construction, there was absolutely no justification for the first respondent to proceed against the appellant based on the said incident. In other words, according to the learned counsel, when the construction in the disputed site was put up by the appellant's father with the full authority of the permission granted by the then Administrator of the first respondent, there was no scope at all for the first respondent to rely upon the said issue for the purpose of issuing a charge-sheet as has been done by first respondent herein. We are unable to accept the said contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. At the outset, we wish to point out that the findings of the second respondent that the father of the appellant put up the construction in the disputed site belonging to the first respondent with the permission of the then Administrator was proved, in our view, is a finding which had absolutely no acceptable basis at all. In this context, we find that the second respondent Labour Court after referring to the stand of the appellant with regard to the so-called permission given by one Sri Hews, the then Administrator of the first respondent, straightaway reached the conclusion to the effect that the appellant did not put up any new building in the place belonging to the first respondent and that his father got the permission from the then Administrator, who built the hut in the year 1959 and that the appellant only renovated the said hut every now and then whenever it got damages. When we put a specific question to the learned counsel for the appellant as to on what basis the second respondent Labour Court came to give the said finding, the learned counsel was not able to refer to any acceptable evidence on record to substantiate the said finding. Though the appellant is stated to have examined two witnesses on his side in the enquiry viz., M/s. Karuppiah and Durairaj, we find those witnesses had only stated that the appellant did not construct any building in the disputed site but was only utilising the same. On the other hand, in the domestic enquiry it appears that one of the defence witnesses, viz., D.W. 1 deposed to the effect that the appellant was running a grocery shop in the said hut and that he also put up new sheds and white washed the hut. Thus the appellant was merrily utilising the property belonging to the first respondent/estate and making monetary gain out of it by putting up certain additional constructions on his own apparently without any authority for putting the said land belonging to the first respondent for any such commercial purpose. Having regard to the abovesaid factors, we are constrained to hold that the findings of the second respondent, Labour Court to the effect that the appellant's father was permitted by the then Administrator of the first respondent was a perverse finding which had absolutely no acceptable material evidence to support.We also find that the second respondent Labour Court also thoroughly misled itself by stating that the appellant had every justification for putting up the construction in the land belonging to the first respondent, inasmuch as according to the second respondent the appellant was not provided with the required residential quarters as required under the provisions of the Plantations Labour Act and therefore there was nothing wrong in the appellant putting up the construction of his own for his abode. THE second respondent, Labour Court, infact, made a sweeping observation to the effect that in the estates it was not quite uncommon for the workers to build houses either in the land belonging to the Estate or in the poramboke lands. As a matter of fact and also indisputably, the appellant is residing in the quarters allotted by the first respondent-Estate and continue to reside therein even as on date. Besides, the appellant had put up some unauthorised construction in some other land belonging to the first respondent which have been put into commercial use by him. Thus the second respondent had completely omitted to take into account relevant circumstances, while referring to certain aspects which were totally irrelevant to the case pleaded by the parties. THE second respondent has thus totally misdirected itself while passing the award impugned in the writ petition. THE order of the learned Single Judge in interfering with the said award of the second respondent was therefore fully justified in the facts and circumstances of this case. In the above stated circumstances, learned Single Judge was pleased to hold that everyone of the findings of the second respondent was not supported by any evidence on record and also not in consonance with the provisions of the Plantations Labour Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Learned Judge was pleased to hold as under in Para. 11 of the order.