ASSOCIATION OF LESSEES OF TEMPLE LANDS PERIYAR DISTRICT Vs. ARULMIGU VARADARAJA PERUMAL TEMPLE ETC PERIYAR DISTRICT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner in this Civil Revision petition, ?Association of Lessees of Temple Lands?, a registered society, filed O.S. No. 535 of 1989 on the file of the Principal District Munsif's Court, Erode against the respondent-temple for a permanent injunction, restraining the respondent from interfering with the alleged possession of the suit properties, by a fresh lease auction, or from interfering with the enjoyment of the same by the members of the plaintiff society. In the said suit, the plaintiff peti tioner filed I.A. No. 630 of 1989 for a similar temporary injunction. THE said I.A. was dismissed by order dated 15-7-1989 and the subsequent appeal filed by the petitioner in C.M.A 16 of 1989 on the file of the Principal District Judge was also dismissed by order dated 4-8-1989. Aggrieved by it, the plaintiff has preferred this revision petition.

(2.) EARLIER to the institution of the above suit, 22 members of the petitioner-Association took the suit lands belonging to the respondent-temple in a public auction for the year 1985-86. After the expiry of the said year, the respondent-temple sought to lease out the said lands once again in public auction, when the said lessees filed 22 differents suits against the respondent for injunction restraining it from leasing out the said lands. There, the lessees claimed protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. The suits ended in a compromise and were dismissed as evidenced by Exs. A40 and A50 and Exs. B1 to B60. The lessees and the respondent filed a joint memos to the effect that they would not claim protection under the cultivating tenants Protection Act, that the lessees would deliver vacant possession of the said lands to the respondent on 30-6-1989 and after 30-6-1989 they have no right to continue in possession thereof.

(3.) IN Muralidhar v. State of U.P. 1 , the facts are different, the agreement in question there, was not presented before court inviting it to pass an order accordingly and the court had not passed an order accordingly. When an agreement is presented before a court in all solemnity inviting the court to pass an order accordingly and the court accordingly passed an order, it will be against public policy, only if any party goes back on it. By such agreements as had been reached in the present case and the consequent orders of the Court, the tenancy as such came to an end in each case and only delivery was postponed till 30 6-1989. The agreements amounted to voluntary surrender of the demised property and only its effective date is postponed to 30-6-1989. So, in view of the tenancy coming to an end the decision in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal 2 , and Amrit Bhikaji v. Kashinath Janardhan 3 have no application. No doubt in Amrit Bhikaji v. Kashinath Janardhan 6 , referred to above, the earlier statement by the tenant that he was willing to hand over possession to the landlord was made in a proceeding before the court. But, in the present case, it is not a mere case of some statement earlier made before the court, but such a statement was made in an agreement between the parties pending a proceeding before the court and it was solemnly made before the court inviting the court to pass an order accordingly. This certainly stands on a different footing. Therefore also the decision in Amrit Bhikaji v. Kashinath Janardhan 1 , referred to above has no application to the present case.