P DWARAKNATH REDDY Vs. NEW INDIA MARITIME AGENCIES

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE appellant in these two writ appeals was the third-respondent in W.P.Nos.13030 and 13031 of 1990. In those writ petitions, the first respondent herein was the petitioner and respondents 2 and 3 herein were respondents 1 and 2 in the writ petitions. We propose to refer to the parties as per their array in the writ petitions. THE petitioner and the third-respondent are owners of properties adjoining one another. THE third-respondent had put up constructions upto third floor in his property. He applied to the second respondent for additional construction of fourth and fifth floors, and his request was negatived by the second respondent on 20.11.1987.THEthird-respondenton 2.12.1987 appealed to the first respondent and he wanted condonation of the shortfalls and a copy of his appeal petition is annexed to this judgment of ours as Annexure "A". On 9.6.1988 the first respondent turned down the appeal of the petitioner, declining to condone the shortfalls. THE copy of the order of the first-respondent, dated 9.6.1988, is Annexure "B". On 20.10.1988, the third respondent made a further representation and he confined his request for condonation of shortfalls for the construction of the fourth floor alone. Obviously giving up his desire to put up a fifth floor. THE copy of his representation is Annexure "C". On 4.1.1989, as per G.O.Ms.No.12, Housing and Urban Development Department, the first respondent accorded exemption under Sec.113of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 (Tamil Nadu Act 35 of 1972), hereinafter referred to as the Act, in respect of the shortfalls and further imposing conditions. THE said Government Order shall be hereinafter referred to as the impugned order, because that is the order impugned in the writ petitions. THE copy of the impugned order is Annexure "D". THE petitioner has been expressing grievances over the constructions of the third respondent and it has been making representations to the Commissioner of Police and the second respondent. THE petitioner, apart from pointing out the violation of the rules framed under the Act, has only been ventilating its grievances on the ground of nuisance, hardship and damage to its property. Ultimately, the petitioner came to this Court, by filing W.P.No.13030 of 1990 to quash the impugned order and W.P.No.13031 of 1990 for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, directing respondents 1 and 2 not to permit construction of an exterior staircase and demolish any such construction found to exist. THE principal contention put forth oy the petitioner before the learned single Judge, who heard and disposed of the writ petitions, was that in the impugned order the first respondent has not disclosed the reason as to why the exemption was granted, and the other contention was that virtually compliance with every relevant rule, the third respondent has been exempted from. THE learned single Judge countenanced the principal grievance of the petitioner and after adverting to the pronouncement in P.J.Irani v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1731, opined that while the impugned order does not show the reasons, which prompted the first respondent to grant the exemption, the files also do not disclose reasons and hence it is not possible to postulate whether the first respondent took into consideration matters, which are germane and relevant to the policy and purpose of the Act and the Rules while granting the exemption. In this view, the learned single Judge allowed the writ petitions and the impugned order was quashed. THE learned single Judge repelled the contention put forth on behalf of the third respondent, that the petitioner lacked locus standi to maintain the writ petitions. For expressing this view, he followed the pronouncement of Bakthavatsalam, J. in Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1990)1 M.L.J. 222, and confirmed by the Bench, to which one of us (Nainar Sundaram, J.) had been a party in Haji Moosa Sulaiman Sait and others v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by its Commissioner and Secretary, Housing and Urban Development, Madras, and others, W.A.Nos.1104 of 1989 and 129,279 and380 of 1990, judgment dated 25.6.1990. THEse two writ appeals are directed against the common order of the learned single Judge.

(2.) WHEN these two writ appeals came up for admission yesterday, we formed an opinion that considering the scope of the controversy in the writ appeals, they require expeditious disposal on merits. Mr.Sriram Panchu has already entered caveat for the petitioner. Mr.K.Ravirajapandia, Additional Government Pleader (Writs) represents the first respondent and Mr.A.Challakumar represents the second respondent.

(3.) IN Harishankar Bagia v. M.P.State, (1954)2M.LJ. 211:1954 S.C.J. 637:55 Crl.L.J. 1322. A.I.R 1954 S.C. 465, the conferment of a discretion on the Textile Commissioner under Clause 3 of the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, 1948 to issue permits regarding transport was attacked as unregulated and arbitrary. That was repelled by the Supreme Court by observing as follows: