FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA Vs. GEORGE VARGHESE ASSISTANT MANAGER QUALITY CONTROL FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA TUTICORIN TIRUNELVCLI DISTRICT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE first-respondent in W.P.No.7108 of 1981 is the appellant in this writ appeal. THE petitioner in the writ petition is the first respondent herein and the second respondent in the writ petition is the second respondent herein. Convenience suggests to us to adopt in the course of this judgment, the nomenclature assigned to the parties in the writ petition. THE petitioner was in. the employ of the respondents. THE petitioner was sought to be proceeded against in disciplinary action on the ground that he, along with others and conniving with them, during the period from 14. 3. 1974 to 20. 3. 1975 committed gross misconduct by fraudulently and dishonestly appending certificates to the bills submitted by a Food Corporation of India contractor to the effect that the services for which charges were claimed, were performed and carried out satisfactorily and the quantity handled was correct and thereby facilitated the contractor to get an excess payment of Rs.19,180 and further he had also prepared, signed and submitted false monthly statements and thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and contravened Regulation 31 of Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971. THE issuance of the charge memorandum happened on 9. 4. 1981. Earlier to this, no disciplinary action, by issuance of any charge memorandum, took place. But, there was an order dated 14th March, 1975, placing the petitioner under suspension on the ground that disciplinary proceedings were in contemplation. However, nothing happened pursuant thereto. THE proposed disciplinary proceedings were obviously forgotten and not pursued. On the other hand, the petitioner was hauled up in a criminal, case along with others for offences under Sec.120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Sec.5(2) read with Sec.5(l) of Prevention of Corruption Act. THE first information report in the criminal case was launched on 23. 6. 1975. THE Special Judge for Police Establishment Cases at Hyderabad convicted the petitioner for the aforesaid offences on 25. 1.1978. On 15. 5. 1978, the petitioner was dismissed on the basis of the conviction by the criminal court. THEre was an appeal by the petitioner as against his conviction by the criminal court, and that appeal, along with the appeals by others, similarly involved, was heard by the High Court of Judicature Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad and the petitioner as well as others were acquitted on the ground the prosecution has not proved, beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of the accused and the accused were entitled to benefit of doubt. THE judgment in appeal was rendered on 23. 10. 1979. THE petitioner was reinstated in service, but he was visited with the charge memorandum, as stated above, on 9. 4. 1981. THE petitioner came to this Court by way of the writ petition praying for the issue of writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the charge memorandum and to interdict the respondents from conducting the departmental enquiry. THE point that was advanced on behalf of the petitioner before the learned single Judge, who heard and disposed of the writ petition, was that after the verdict of the Appellate Court in the criminal case, it is not open to the respondents to proceed against the petitioner departmentally. THE learned single Judge accepted this proposition and allowed the writ petition. This has obliged the first respondent to prefer this writ appeal.

(2.) ON the question as to whether the acquittal by the criminal court would bar the initiation or continuation of the departmental enquiry, the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Corporation of Nagpur v. Ramchandra G.Modak, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 626:1984 Lab.I.C. 179: (1981)2 S.C.C. 714, is the ruling that governs. The following passage in that pronouncement needs extraction as follows: "The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court. Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its discretion in any way fettered. However, as quite some time has elapsed since the departmental inquiry had started. The authority concerned will take into consideration this factor in coming to the conclusion if it is really worthwhile to continue: the departmental inquiry in the event of the acquittal of the respondents. If, however, the; authority feels that there is sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the inquiry, it can certainly do so". From the above passage, it is clear that if it is a case of the employee, who is an accused in the criminal case getting honourably and completely exonerated of the charges, it would not be expedient to continue a departmental enquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence. At the same time, there could not be subscribing support to a broad proposition that merely because the accused was acquitted in a criminal case, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental enquiry is taken away. Nor can it be stated that its discretion in any way is fettered. The Supreme Court has also indicated that if it is a case where quite some time has elapsed since the departmental enquiry had started, the authority concerned will take into consideration this factor in coming to the conclusion if it is really worthwhile to continue the departmental inquiry in the event of the acquittal of the employee and if however, the authority feels that there is sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the enquiry, it can certainly do so. This pronouncement of the Supreme Court has been followed by a Bench of this Court in M.M.Rubber Company Ltd. Madras v. S.Natarajan and another, (1985)2 L.L.J. 364. A Bench of the High Court of Allahabad also in P.H.Tripathi v. Central Bank of India and others, (1985)2 L.L.J. 500 has followed the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Corporation of Nagpur v. Ramchandra G.Modak, A.I.R 1984 S.C. 626. Thus, in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, we are not able to subscribe our support to the broad proposition which has guided the learned single Judge when he dismissed the writ petition that when there has been an acquittal by the criminal court on the very same charges, there could not be initiation and prosecution of departmental action.