(1.) THIS is an appeal against the order of Mohan, J. dated 30th August, 1976, dismissing W.P. No.2638 of 1976 filed by the Appellant herein. While the appellant was the Headmaster of a School, he was arrested for certain offences, including one under section 120-D of the Indian Penal Code. Consequent on his arrest, he was suspended. On 12th September, 1976 he was convicted by the Sessions Judge, and on 11th July, 1970, based on his conviction, he was dismissed. On 21st April, 1971, on appeal his conviction relating to the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, was confirmed. However, he was released under section. 4 (1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Consequent on the judgment of the appellate court, the appellant was also reinstated.
(2.) THEREAFTER action was taken under rule 154 of the Tamil Nadu Educational Rules. A show-cause notice was issued by the Director of School Education (Respondent) herein to the Appellant, drawing his attention to the fact of conviction and asking him to. show cause why his T.S.L.C.should not be cancelled.On 9th April, 1976,he submitted his reply. Not being satisfied with his reply, the impugned order of cancellation of the certificate came to be passed on 26th June, 1976. It was to quash that order the present writ petition was filed. The learned Judge having dismissed the writ petition, the present writ appeal has been filed.
(3.) SECTION 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, reads as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law": Provided that nothing in. this section shall apply to a person who, after his release under section 4, is subsequently sentenced for the original offence. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of this section in Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway and another v. T.R. Chellappan1: In paragraph 11 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed: "This brings to the consideration of two interconnected questions, namsly, as to what is the effect of the order of the Magistrate releasing the accused on probation and the effect of section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. It was suggested by the Respondent that, if the Magistrate does not choose, after convicting the accused, to pass any sentence on him, but releases him on probation, then" the stigma of conviction is completely, washed out and obliterated, and therefore, rule 14 (1) of the Rules of 1968 will not apply in terms: We are, however, unable to agree with this somewhat broad proposition. A perusalof the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, clearly shows that the mere fact that the accused is released on probation does not obliterate the stigma of conviction."