K PALANIKUMAR Vs. INDIAN BANK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE facts leading to the writ petition are as follows : The petitioner passed B. Com, examination in the year 1977 held by the Madras University. He belongs to the Scheduled caste. An advertisement appeared sometime in December, 1977 in the Hindu calling for applications from candidates for appointment as clerk/shroff under the first respondent-Indian Bank. The petitioner filed his application. It requires to be stated at this stage that the advertisement indicated the nature of particulars which the candidate was required to furnish. Under column (h) the candidate was required to furnish the names of relatives, if any, working in Indian Bank and the nature of relationship together with the name of the Branch where they work. Admittedly the petitioner's step-brother was working in the Bank in its Bombay Fort Branch. Thinking that this column related only to parents and, therefore, he need not give the particulars required in his application dated 21-1-1978 that column was left blank. On 1-8-1978 the petitioner was directed to be present for an interview at the Staff Training College, 'leelavathi Mansion, II Floor No. 69, Armenian street, Madras-1. The petitioner did take the interview. Thereafter by an order dated 15th November, 1978, the petitioner was provisionally selected for appointment as a clerk in the service of the Bank subject to be being medically found fit for the job on the following terms and conditions :

(2.) MR. A. Ramachandran, learned counsel for the petitioner raises the following submissions : The rights of the parties in the instant case are governed by the Sastry Award which is binding between the parties. Paragraph 493 of the Award does not require these particulars but merely states that the relatives should not be employed in the same office. Therefore, the very instance of particulars in this column which are not germane for the appointment is itself arbitrary. The petitioner sought an employment in his own right and on his own merits. There is no reason why he should be required to give particulars to his step brother who is working far away in Bombay Fort Branch.

(3.) THEN again the so-called suppression is not a material suppression which will vitiate the order of appointment or which would require the termination of probation. As a matter of fact, there are instances as quoted in the petition as items (i) and (iii) in ground (g ). Wherein there were similar suppressions but nevertheless the respondent-Bank was prepared to condone and, therefore, the petitioner has been subjected to a hostile treatment, thereby violating Art. 14 of the Constitution. Lastly, it is urged that the termination of probation must be for a valid cause and it cannot be done arbitrarily. In the instant case just on the last day before the completion of six months as laid down in paragraph 495 in Sastry Award, the termination has come to be given effect to. Even assuming that the respondent-Bank has got that power of termination it cannot pass an order containing a stigma on the petitioner as if he had suppressed. The Supreme Court in Ramana v. I. A. Authority of India, (A. I. R. 1979 1629) in dealing with a case of contractual nature has held that the public bodies or institutions are also expected to confirm to certain norms and cannot afford to act arbitrarily. In Miss. P. S. Geeta v. Central Bank of India, (1979) I Andra Weekly Reporter 73 at page 81, it has been held that a provision giving preference to the employees of the Bank was violative of Art. 16 and is offensive of equal protection under law. That principle also has to be applied in this case.