P. SHANKAR RAO Vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY THE HOME SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS AND ANR.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition has been filed by one Thiru Shankar Rao under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 11th August, 1969 of the Government of India compulsorily retiring him from the Indian Administrative Service. The impugned order reads as follows:

(2.) The petitioner attacked the order on several grounds in his original affidavit his main contention being that the order was arbitrary and capricious. The first respondent filed a counter -affidavit of Thiru Sec. Narasimhan, Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, and took the stand that the Government of India was not required to give any reasons for reaching their decision. This stand was persisted in by them before Ismail, J., before whom the petition came up for hearing first. But eventually the Government did not persist in their stand and offered to give reasons which weighed with them and also to produce the concerned files. Opportunity was given for that purpose. By that time the petitioner had filed a reply affidavit. The first respondent filed a further counter -affidavit mentioning the reasons and the petitioner filed a further reply affidavit. It was stated before Ismail, J., that, among other things, the first respondent wanted to rely on certain observations of Ramakrishnan and Natesan, JJ., In view of that circumstance Ismail, J., felt it desirable that the petition should be heard by a Bench and that is how the matter has come before us.

(3.) The main question in the writ petition is whether the impugned order was arbitrary. But before deciding that question it will be convenient to clear the ground of some preliminary matters. Though in his affidavits the petitioner contended that Rule 16(3) did not prescribe guidelines to the Central Government and would give scope for discrimination against officers whom they did not like and was, therefore, void under Article 14 of the Constitution, Thiru Chellaswamy, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, stated at the time of the hearing that he was not questioning the vires of the rule. He recognised that the criterion of public interest for compulsorily retiring an officer under Rule 16(3) would itself be a sufficient guideline, and he himself cited Butail v/s. Union of India : (1970) ILLJ 147 Del , (confirmed by the Supreme me Court in C.A. Nos. 1614 to 1616 of 1968 dated 8th September, 1970). He also stated that, having regard to the several decisions of the Supreme Court, he could not urge that compulsory retirement under Rule 16(3) would be a punishment so as to require the Central Government to adopt the procedure enjoined by Article 311 of the Constitution. In other words, he conceded that it was not necessary to give the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of making a representation as to why the order should not have been passed. In view of this concession, it is unnecessary to discuss the several cases cited at the bar, and it would be enough to mention the more important of them: Shyamkl y. State of Utter Pradesh and Union of India : (1954) IILLJ 139 SC , State of Bombay v/s. Saubhagchand M. Doshi : [1958] 1 SCR 571 Moti Ram Deka v/s. General Manager N.E.F. Railways : (1964) IILLJ 467 SC , Sivacharan's case : (1967) IILLJ 246 SC , Saxena's case : (1976) IILLJ 154 SC , State of U.P. v/s. Madan Mohan : (1967) IILLJ 63 SC , and Union of India v/s. J.N. Sinha : (1970) IILLJ 284 SC .