PERUMAL AND ANR. Vs. STATE OF MADRAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal against the judgment of the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madras awarding compensation of Rs. 3,000/ - under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The claimants are the parents of the deceased Rani, who was run over by the State Transport Bus M.S.S. 9037 and have preferred this appeal claiming enhancement of the compensation that has been awarded. It is not disputed that the injuries that resulted in the death of Rani, the victim of the motor accident, were caused by the rash and negligent driving of the State Transport Bus. The only question that arises for consideration is whether the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is reasonable and related to the relevant circumstances and if not, whether it is liable to be enhanced and if so, to what amount. The girl that lost her life, was 8 years' old at the time of the accident. P.W. 4, who is the father of the deceased, is working as a cooly in the Royapuram Goods shed earning Rs. 5 per day. Admittedly he could not afford to send the deceased to school. The Tribunal, after considering the uncertainties of life and the status of the family, in which the deceased was born, fixed the sum of Rs. 3,000 as just and reasonable compensation for the loss of the life of the child. The question raised before me has vexed many courts in India and England and has provoked some judges to embark upon metaphysical investigation into the value of human life and ultimately to exclaim that the answer to the question is far from simple. In Benham v. Gambling, 1941 AC 157 Viscount Simon L.C. said:

(2.) YET another difficulty that besets the courts is this. Most appellate courts refuse to interfere with the quantum of compensation awarded by the trial courts on the ground that the sum awarded is neither unduly high nor unduly low. This principle of judicial neutrality has resulted in a lack of uniformity in the decisions of the trial courts. In my experience, I have found that the compensation awarded for the death of an infant of the same age varies from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 10,000 according to the discretion of the Judge concerned. The range of variation between one trial judge and another in fixing the amount of compensation is almost whimsical and bewildering. In these circumstances, it is desirable that the Legislature lays down guide lines, which would enable the courts to fix the quantum of compensation in such matters in the light of prevailing sociological values. In fact in England, the Council of Law Society to the Departmental Committee on the Alternative Remedies, recommended for the purpose of securing uniformity in fatal cases, that a statutory scale should be provided for the calculation of damages for the loss of expectation of life. The following scale was suggested though not accepted:

(3.) LEARNED Counsel for the Appellants would ask me to award a separate sum of money as compensation for the mental agony and suffering of the deceased. But evidence shows that immediately after the accident, the child became unconscious. Courts have been consistently refusing to award compensation in such cases evidently on the basis that an unconscious person cannot suffer from pain or agony. I therefore refuse to award any separate amount on this account.