LAWS(MAD)-1960-2-1

SILVER CLOUD ESTATE Vs. LABOUR COURT

Decided On February 12, 1960
SILVER CLOUD ESTATE Appellant
V/S
LABOUR COURT Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) DURING the time when an industrial dispute (Industrial Dispute No. 1 of 1954) was pending before the Special Industrial Tribunal for Plantations (Labour Court, Coimbatore), the management of Silver Cloud Estate, Gudalur, found a necessity to effect a retrenchment of certain number of workers. It is not disputed that the workmen affected by the retrenchment were not directly concerned in the industrial dispute. Nor was the retrenchment otherwise than bona fide. The management, however, sought to obtain previous sanction of the labour court for effecting retrenchment in Petition No. 113 of 1957. It is said that the application was withdrawn, on a view expressed by the labour court during the course of hearing that the proper procedure for the management was to effect, the retrenchment first and then seek approval of the Court under Section 33 (2) of the Act. The retrenchment was then effected in purported conformity with the rules and compensation paid to the workers. There is no complaint by the concerned workers against the procedure adopted. There had been no application by them under Section 33a of the Act. The management filed Petition No. 11 of 1958 under Section 33 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for approval of its action in the matter of the retrenchment of the workers. The labour court, Coimbatore, held that the financial condition of the management did not justify the retrenchment, and in that view, rejected the application. The validity of that order is questioned in the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(2.) MR. Narayanaswami, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has raised three contentions in regard to the jurisdiction of the labour court to pass the order it did. The learned Counsel first contended that the application itself was an unnecessary one, as the retrenchment, not being effected by way of punishment for any misconduct on the part of the workers, was outside the purview of Section 33 (2) of the Act, and, therefore, it was not necessary for the management to obtain either the previous or ex post facto sanction of the Court. Secondly, it was contended that the labour court erred in proceeding to adjudicate on the merits of the retrenchment, and while functioning under Section 32 (1) the only question for consideration was whether there was a prima facie case for discharging the workmen and whether there was no improper motive which actuated (?) the management in regard to the same. Thirdly, it was contended that the order of the Court contained certain obvious errors on the face of the record, which would merit the quashing of the order under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(3.) IT is unnecessary to deal with the points 2 and 3 mentioned above or to consider whether in the instant case the conduct of the management in employing part-time workers after discharging1 the permanent workmen from its plantation was a device adopted by it for effecting retrenchment, such not being the case of the workers. I am of opinion that, in the circumstances of this case, the learned Counsel is well founded in his first contention.