L N MUKERJEE Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) OUR learned brother was not inclined to accept the view of the law in these decisions, and preferred instead the decision of a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Bachan Pande v. State. which took a view Opposite to the Madras eases. In the context of the importance of this question and the conflict of authority. : be made , a reference for placing the papers before a Bench in consequence of which these petitions are now before us.

(2.) THE, matter has now been extensively argued with citation of authorities, both by the learned Advocate General and the learned Public Prosecutor for the State, and the learned Counsel for the petitioners (Sri G. Gopalaswami ). We are indebted to the arguments of the learned Counsel far the elucidation and also for bringing to our notice the available and relevant authorities.

(3.) THE argument of the learned Advocate General has really two limbs or branches, but they are inter-related and not distinct. It could even be said that one branch leads to the other. The learned Advocate General presses the thesis that the court of Sessions, Madras, would certainly have jurisdiction to try both the offences of criminal conspiracy committed in Calcutta, and the further offences committed in Madras in pursuance of that conspiracy at a single trial held at Madras. According to the learned Advocate General the earlier decision of this Court in AIR 1936 Mad 317, was, not correctly decided, as it totally overlooked Section 180, Cr. P. C. which applies to the facts. Admittedly, the other decision in AIR 1929 Mad 839, is not so directly relevant upon the question of the jurisdiction of the court of Session, Madras to try the accused for both sets of offences here. The learned Advocate General would develop his argument thus: Section 177 Cr. P. C. which is the ordinary rule as to jurisdiction, itself adopts the English Common Law rule as to venue, which is a broad and fundamental principle. But that principle is subject to exceptions, whether statutory or springing from interpretation by case law. It is for this reason that Section 177 Cr. P. C. itself significantly declares that. Every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed. This common law principle as to venue will be found stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 10, Section 595 pace 325. But, as will be clear from Section 607 (page 329) of the same authority, criminal conspiracy itself has always been recognised as an exception with regard to the question of venue. The proposition on this matter is of some Importance and is set forth in Halsbury as follows: Conspiracy may be tried in the place where the conspirators agreed to do the wrongful act which is the object of the conspiracy, but as the place of agreement is often unknown conspiracy Is generally a matter of inference deduced from criminal acts of the accused persons which are done In pursuance of any criminal purpose, and are often not confined to one place; a chare (c) of conspiracy may consequently be laid at common law in any country where one of these criminal acts is committed. This is upon the authority of a very early English case R. v. Brisao, (1803) 4 East 164. We might also refer here to Archbold's "criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice" 33rd Edn. pages 1480-1481. The learned author therein points out that! the venue: may be laid in any country In which the accused persons did an act in furtherance of the common objects of the conspiracy. The principle could also relate to the conspiracy alleged to have been entered into on the high seas; R. v. Kohn, (1864) 4 F and F 68. Also see Russell on "crime" Vol. 1, 11th Edn. p. 679.