MANAGEMENT OF "WOODBRIAR" ESTATE, DEVARSHOLA POST AND SUSSEX ESTATES, NELLACOTTAH Vs. WORKERS IN "WOODBRIAR" ESTATE, DEVASHOLA POST

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Sussex Estate in the Nilgiris one of the two estates belonging to and managed by the petitioner, had amongst its employees one M. Mohamed and one P. Hydross. For violating certain clauses of the standing orders and for abusing the superintendent of the estate in vulgar language when questioned about it, the two workers were charged by the management on 4 -12 -1958. When the charges were being handed over to the workers by the superintendent on the following day, the workers were alleged to have behaved in an insubordinate manner, by abusing the superintendent in vulgar and filthy language The management, thereupon, framed charges against the two workers in respect of what happened that day, and on certain other matter. M. Mohamed was charged (1) for abusing the superior officer in filthy language when the previous chargesheet was handed over to him, (2) for declaring openly that he would disobey the orders of his superiors, and (3) for riotous and disorderly behaviour at the muster ground. The other worker, Hydross, was charged (1) for instigating the other workers to "go slow" in their work, and (2) for abusing the superior officer in vulgar language when the previous charge sheet was served upon him. The management held an enquiry on 15 -12 -1958. At the enquiry, evidence was adduced both by the management as well as the workers. The workers were found guilty of the charges made against them, and they were dismissed. An industrial dispute was raised consequent on such dismissal, and the Slate Government referred for adjudication to the Labour Court Coimbatore, by G.O.Ms. No. 253 (Lab), dated 22 -1 -1958, the following issues;

(2.) IT will be seen that the substantial question before the Labour Court was whether the disciplinary actions taken against the two workers were justified. The Labour Court did not find that there was any lack of good faith on the part of the management, that there was either unfair labour practice or victimisation, and that the finding arrived at by the management in the enquiry conducted by it was cither perverse or baseless. But it held (1) that the charge sheets were m English and there was no evidence on the side of the management to show that they were read out and translated to the workers in the language known to them; (2) that the evidence in the enquiry was not recorded in the language known to the workers, although such evidence was given in Malayalam and Tamil; (3) that there were some corrections in an ink different from that of the rest of the depositions at crucial portions relating to the charges against the workers; and (4) that there was no definite finding by the enquiring officer that the charges, as laid had been proved. The Tribunal, therefore held that the inquiry had not been made in a proper manner, and that the same was vitiated by irregularity in regard to recording of evidence and making corrections thereof, causing prejudice to the workers. In that view, the Tribunal passed an order, setting aside the order of dismissal of the workers. The propriety of the award is questioned in this writ petition, filed by the management.

(3.) IN Balipatra Ten Estates v. Its Workmen; Balipatra Ten Estates v. Its Workmen; , the Supreme Court held that an industrial Tribunal, while adjudicating on an industrial dispute relating to the dismissal of a workman for misconduct, had not got to decide for itself whether the charge framed against the workman concerned had been established to its satisfaction and it had only to be satisfied that the management was justified in coming to the conclusion (in bona fide and proper domestic enquiry), that the charges against the workman were well founded. As I have already stated the Tribunal did not find that there was any lack of good faith on the part of the management in making the charges, or in conducting the enquiry. Nor has it been found that the management has been guilty of any basic error or violation of any principle of natural justice. The workers, no doubt, pleaded that the management intended to victimise them, and that it had been guilty of unfair labour practice. There is, however no basis for the complaint in the evidence, and as the Labour court has not either referred or given finding on that aspect of the question, it must be assumed that there is no basis for the complaint that there has been victimisation or unfair labour practice. In those circumstances, the Tribunal should have only seen whether, on the materials before the management, the finding was justified or so baseless or perverse that it could not accept the same. It is not the case of either party - that on the materials before the management, the conclusion, to which it came, was baseless or perverse. But the labour Court has proceeded to set aside the order of dismissal passed by the management, on the ground that the procedure followed in the enquiry was not proper. It is needless to point out that the Industrial Disputes Act does not prescribe any Procedure for the management to follow in domestic enquiries for investigating misconduct in its employees. Independent of the statute it cannot be said that the management is under an obligation to record depositions of the witnesses at the domestic enquiry and adopt the procedure which a court of law adopts in the trial of cases. In cases, where however the management records evidence, it will be open to the Industrial Tribunal to look into that evidence and ascertain whether the management had sufficient justification to take disciplinary action it did. But, if there is no such record of evidence, it will be for the Tribunal to take evidence to see whether the impugned disciplinary action had been effected bona fide in the exercise of the powers of the management. In the absence of any statutory provisions relating to the procedure in a domestic enquiry, the only obligation of a person conducting the enquiry is that: he will have to act according to the rules of natural justice. The essentials of the rule of natural justice applicable to such cases have been laid down in Local Govt. Board v. Alridge, 1915 AC 120. At page 138, Lord Shaw observed, "If a statute prescribes the means, it must employ them. If it is left without express guidance it must still act honestly and by honest means. In regard to these, certain ways and methods of judicial procedure may very likely be imitated; and lawyer -like methods may find especial favour from lawyers. But that the judiciary should presume to impose its own methods on administrative or executive officers is a usurpation. And the assumption that the methods of natural justice are ex necessitate those of courts of justice is wholly unfounded." Lord Parmour at page 140 observed: