KUPPANNA GOUNDER Vs. PERUMA GOUNDER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This reference arises out of petitions filed under Article 133 of the constitution for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decree and judgment of this court in A. S. Nos. 286 and 376 of 1955. The judgment of this Court affirmed that of the trial court. It has been found that the appeal involves the determination of a substantial question of law. All that remains to be ascertained is whether the subject-matter of dispute in the court of the first instance and still in dispute in the appeal was and continues to be not less than Rs. 20,000.

(2.) The suit, out of which the appeal arises, was valued by respondents 1 and 2 who were the plaintiffs at Rs. 9650. They succeeded in the court of the first instance. When the petitioners, (defendants in the suit) filed appeals to this Court, they adopted that value, as indeed they were bound to do, for the purpose of payment of the necessary court-fee for the appeals. Petitioners now state that the aforesaid value, as estimated by respondents 1 and 2 and even as adopted by them, was erroneous, and that the real value of the Properties was and continued at all material times to be more than Rs. 20,000. It is contended that the petitioners should not be allowed to go behind the value adopted by them in the appeals and show what the real value is. Different views have been expressed on the question whether the petitioners could be permitted to do so. In Venkatarayudu v. Venkanna, AIR 1927 Mad 862, Ramesam and Venkatasubba Rao JJ. held that a plaintiff who adopted a particular value in regard to the subject-matter of a suit in the plaint would not be absolutely precluded from showing the real value when a question arose in connection with has rights of appeal to the Privy Council. A different view was taken recently by Basheer Ahmed Sayeed and Subrahmanyam JJ. in S. C. P. Nos. 7 and 8 of 1958. In view of this conflict, the following question has been referred to the Full Bench for opinion :

(3.) Where a party who seeks a certificate under Article 123(a) or (b) or one who opposes the grant of such certificate wants to allege that the value given or adopted by him at an earlier stage of the litigation is not the true or real value, he would undoubtedly be taking an inconsistent position. It is undesirable that a party should be allowed to take up inconsistent positions in a court of law. That rule is a rule of prudence and in its application has its limitations. An erroneous statement as to value made at an earlier stage cannot deprive a party of a right; it will only prevent a party from proving the real value in certain circumstanes.