KADALUNDI PULIKKALAKATH SAIDALAYI THANGAL Vs. THRIKKANNUR PULATHOTTATHIL MOHIDEEN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This second appeal arises out of a suit under Section 21, Malabar Tenancy Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) for restoration of possession of land which the pltf. haying held it on a Kanom under deft 1 surrendered to him after expiry of the term in response to a demand by deft 1 that he required it for his own cultivation. The pltf's case is that he did not 'bona fide' so require it, because deft 1 having thus obtained possession on 16-3-1943 made a transfer of the property to deft 2 on 28-3-1943 barely 12 days afterwards. The answer to the action so far as material to the disposal of this second appeal was twofold : (1) that there was no eviction of the pltf in a suit under Section 20 of the Act for any right of suit for restoration under Section 21 to arise or accrue; & (2) that the suit laid on 9-10-1944 more than one year from the date of the transfer is time barred under Section 43 (1) (a) of the Act. The Cts below have concurrently negatived the first line of defence. As to the second, the lower appellate Ct has upheld it differing from the trial Ct & has dismissed the suit as time barred. Mr. Pocker assails the judgment of the lower appellate Ct on the point of limitation, while Mr. Ramakrishna Aiyar besides maintaining it as correct, attacks the view of the Cts, below on the first line of defence as erroneous.

(2.) The ground of difference between the Cts below on the question of limitation lies in this : that whereas the trial Ct holds that the date of deft 2 getting into possession which was one year after the surrender is the 'terminus a quo' the lower appellate Ct holds the date of the transfer to deft 2 to be the starting point of limitation. In my judgment, the transfer contemplated by Section 43 (1) (a) of the Act is clearly the transfer referred to in Section 21 (1) as I "on any kind of lease or mortgage with possession or on kanam, kuzhikanam or verumpattam". In the present case the transfer to| deft 2 is what is evidenced by Exs. D. 3 & D. 1" executed on one and the same date, the registered mtge by deft 1 to the second & the registered panaya kychit by deft 2 to the first, respectively. If possession under the transfer passed to deft 2 only one year thereafter as held by the learned Dist Munsif in the trial Ct the suit would be in time. That question has not been considered by the learned Subordinate Judge on appeal in the erroneous view that he took that it is immaterial, what is material according to him being only the date of the transfer. This case must therefore go back to the lower appellate Ct, for a fresh determination of the question subject to my decision on the first line of defence to the suit repelled by the Cts below but sought to be supported by Mr. Ramakrishna Aiyar before me.

(3.) The view of the Cts below as to this is that in terms of Section 21 (1) of the Act the present is a case in which eviction as denned by Section 3 (e) i.e., recovery of possession of land from a tenant, was obtained by deft 1 on the ground specified in Clause (5) of Section 20, no matter that he obtained it by merely making a private demand without having recourse to a suit under Section 20. No doubt Section 21 (1) following, & it does, closely upon Section 20 which relates to a suit for eviction 'prima facie' suggests that the eviction referred to in Section 21 (1) is one obtained by means of a suit as mentioned in Section 20 (1). I am not however satisfied on the careful thought bestowed by me since reservation of judgment that the view of the Cts below is erroneous. It seems to me that while juxtaposition of sections in a statute may well afford sometimes a helpful clue to their interpretation, the language of each section by itself is the more material matter on a question of its interpretation. "Eviction" in the marginal note to Section 20 means, as the section itself shows, eviction by means of a suit. That however is no reason, why eviction in Section 21 (1) should not be understood as covering eviction otherwise than by suit, if the wider connotation is, as I hold, warranted by the definition of "eviction" in Section 3 (e), namely, that it means recovery of possession of land from a tenant, 'simpliciter' & no matter how. The definition does not of course govern where there is something repugnant to in the subject or context. In my opinion, there is nothing however in the subject or context of Section 21 (1) which is repugnant to the appln. of the definition to the word 'eviction" occurring there. "In any case" is the expression with which the section begins, not "in the case of any suit". "On the ground specified" in Clause (5) of Section 20 & not "under Clause 5 of Section 20" are again the words which we have in the section. Far from there being anything in the subject or context of Section 21 (1) to preclude the importation therein to of the general definition of "eviction" in Section 3 (e) it seems to me that there is in the language of Section 21 (1) as chosen by the Legislature an intention revealed not to restrict the beneficient operation of this section only to cases of eviction obtained by means of suits as provided for in the immediately preceding section.