LAWS(MAD)-1950-8-40

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX Vs. V P RAO

Decided On August 02, 1950
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX Appellant
V/S
V.P. RAO (DECEASED) Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a cage referred to us under Section 66(1), Income-tax Act, 1922, by a Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench. At the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, the Tribunal has referred to this Court for decision the following question :

(2.) DURING the pendency of that application Mr. V. P. Rao died, and his legal representatives were brought on record. They wanted another question to be referred to this Court in addition, namely, "whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has no power to award costs and interest in any appeal before it." This question has not been referred to this Court because the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal held, that all applications for reference under Section 66 of the Act must be by substantive applications, and that there is no provision as in the Civil P. C., for the filing of cross-objections; and, further that the respondents had not paid the requisite court-fee for the reference, and that the request was also barred by time, and that the question had not been raised before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal when it heard Mr. V. P. Rao's case and there appeared to be also no provision of law for awarding costs or interest to the successful party before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, So we are not concerned with the other question now and the only question before this Court is the question regarding the taxability of the said Rs. 3000 or the alleged right to be exempted from taxation under Section 4 (3) (vii) of the Act.

(3.) MR. Rama Rao Sahib for the Commissioner of Income-tax agreed that the Rs. 3000, in this case were not receipts arising from business and were not also receipts by way of addition to the remuneration of MR. V. P. Rao as an employee. He also conceded that the receipts did not arise from the exercise of a profession or vocation, as MR. V. P. Rao was not by profession an arbitrator. Nor was his vocation arbitration. MR. Rama Rao Sahib said that 'vocation' would mean, the calling in which a person passes his life adopting the definition in Partridge v. Mallandaine, (1886) 18 Q. B. D. 276 : (66 L. J. Q. B. 251) and he conceded that MR. V. P. Rao was not passing his life in arbitration. But he strongly contended that the remuneration of Rs. 3000 was a receipt arising from MR. V. P. Rao's occupation as an arbitrator in the said proceedings, and so he would not claim exemption from taxation under Section 4 (3) (vii) of the Act. He further contended that the said fee or remuneration was also not of a casual and non-recurring nature, and that for this reason also that would not be exempt from taxation under Section 4 (3) (vii). He gave the definition of 'occupation' as 'being occupied with, or engaged in something' relying on the Oxford Dictionary. The learned counsel for the assessee urged vehemently that the word 'occupation' would mean the trade or calling by which a person seeks his livelihood as stated in MR. Sampath Aiyangar's Commentary on the Indian Income-tax Act, and that it would mean much the same thing as "vocation". We cannot agree. No doubt, "occupation" is used sometimes in the same sense as vocation. But it is used more often in the other sense mentioned by MR. Rama Rao Sahib. In the New English Dictionary edited by E, A. Baker, M. A. D. D., one of the meanings given for "occupation" is "the state of being employed or engaged in some way". In the Law Lexicon of British India, by MR. Ramanatha Aiyar, 1940 Edn. the meaning given for "occupation" is "the principal business of one's life ; vocation, calling, trade ; the business which a man follows to procure a living or obtain wealth ; that which occupies or engages one's time or attention; etc."