S A SESHADRI AYYANGAR Vs. A NARAYANA NAIR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The landlord of a non-residential building in the Madras City is the appellant and the tenant is the respondent in this Letters Patent Appeal. The Madras Nonresidential Buildings Control Order, 1946, hereinafter referred to as the Order, expired on 30-9-1946 and the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XV [15] of 1946, hereinafter referred to as the Act, came into force on 1-101946. The landlord obtained an order from the Rent Controller for eviction of the tenant under Section 8 of the Order on 29-5-1946 and this order was confirmed by the Collector on appeal on 15-7-1946. On 2-8-1946 the landlord applied to the City Civil Court for execution of the order for eviction in accordance with Section 8 (3) of the Order which provided that such order

(2.) A preliminary objection was taken to the maintainability of the appeal to this Court against the order of the Judge of the City Civil Court on the ground that neither the Order nor the Act in terms gave such a right of appeal. Both Section 8 (3) of the Order and Section 9 of the Act provided that every order for eviction passed by the Bent Controller or an appellate authority should be executed by the specified civil Court, as if it were a decree of that Court. Section 18 (1) of the Act provided that proceedings in execution filed under the provisions of the Order and pending at the commencement of the Act, shall be deemed to have been filed under the corresponding provisions of the Act and continued accordingly. It is trite law that a right of appeal against a judicial order does not exist unless given by statute. But it is equally well-settled that

(3.) The contention of the appellant is that since Section 9 (2A) of the Order which conferred a revisional power on the Provincial Government and indeed the whole Order had expired by efflux of time on 30-9-1946, the Provincial Government lost all jurisdiction on that date and its order purporting to be passed on the revision petition of the tenant on 13-3-1947 was null and void. The argument of the respondent, accepted by the learned Judge, is that even before 30-9-1946, the tenant had acquired a vested right to take up his case in revision to the Provincial Government under Section 9 (2A) o the Order and this right was not lost on the expiry of the period for which the Order was in force. It is also urged that the Act recognises that rights acquired under the Order while it was in force, could be enforced even after its expiry. The validity of these contentions has to be examined.