RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR Vs. N.M.KANDAPPA GOUNDAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE facts necessary for appreciating the question of law which arises in this appeal may be briefly stated. The appellant field a suit to recover amounts due for principal and interest under three promissory notes dated 21 -8 -1929, 28 -8 -1929 and 4 -9 -1929. The suit was filed on 9 -8 -1944. The appellant relied upon four endorsements of payment to save the claim from the bar of limitation. The last of such endorsements was made on 9 -8 -1941. It has been found by both the Courts below that these endorsements are of 'open payments' which would not save the claim from the bar of limitation under Section 20, Limitation Act, as it stood before the Amending Act XVI [16] of 1943. The appeal was argued on that assumption. The contention on behalf of the appellant was that the Amending Act applied to the suit and the endorsements would be sufficient within the meaning of Section 20 as amended by it. Both the Courts held that the appellant could not rely upon the Amending Act, because the claim to recover the amounts due under the suit promissory notes became barred by limitation prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act and dismissed the suit as barred by limitation.

(2.) THE case is directly covered by the decision of Viswanatha Sastri J. in Mangapathi Naidu v. Krishnaswami Naidu, : AIR1950Mad762 . An unreported decision of Somasundaram J. in Hanumayamma v. Venkatanarasimharao, C. R. P. 148 of 1947, dated 11 -11 -1949 is to the same effect. Satyanarayana Rao J. before whom the appeal came on originally for hearing, however, thought that as the question raised was of sufficient importance and of frequent occurrence there should be an authoritative decision by a Division Bench.

(3.) SECTION 2, Limitation Act, 1877, expressly provided as follows: 'A reference to the Limitation Act, 1871, shall be read as if made to this Act, and nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect any title acquired, or to revive any right to sue barred, under that Act or under any enactment thereby repealed.' No doubt a similar provision is not found in the Limitation Act, 1908, but this is probably because of Section 6(a), General Clauses Act, 1897, which embodies a similar provision. Apart from decided cases, it appears to follow on principle that the right of action barred by limitation at the time when a new Act or amendment comes into force cannot be revived by the subsequent change in the law brought about by the new Act or amendment.