LAWS(MAD)-2000-7-32

OOTHU ESTATE SINGUMPATTI GROUP NELLAI KATTABOMMAN DISTRICT Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER LABOUR COURT TIRUNELVELI

Decided On July 14, 2000
OOTHU ESTATE, SINGUMPATTI GROUP, NELLAI KATTABOMMAN DISTRICT Appellant
V/S
PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, TIRUNELVELI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE subject-matter involved and also the parties herein are common in these writ petitions, both the writ petitions are taken up together with the consent of the parties concerned. THEse writ petitions have been filed by the petitioner-management seeking for a writ of certiorari to call for the records and to quash the award, dated December 29, 1992 in I.D. Nos. 414 and 413 of 1989 on the file of the first respondent Labour Court, Tirunelveli. In support of the writ petitions, the petitioners herein, have filed separate affidavits wherein they have narrated all the facts and circumstances that forced them to file the present writ petitions and requested this Court to allow the writ petitions as prayed for. Per contra, in the counter-affidavits filed by the second respondents, they have rebutted all the material allegations levelled against them one after the other and ultimately they have requested this Court to dismiss the writ petitions for want of merit, since according to them the impugned awards are in order and in accordance with law. Heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. I have perused the contents of the affidavits and the counter-affidavits together with all other relevant material documents available on record in the form of typed set of papers. I have also taken into consideration the various points raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties during the course of their arguments.

(2.) IN the above facts and circumstances, of these cases, the only point that arises for consideration in these cases is as to whether there are any valid grounds to allow these writ petitions or not.The brief facts of the case of the petitioners as seen from their affidavits are as follows : The petitioner is a part of the Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation and has an Estate at Nellai Kattabomman District with an area of 512 acres wherein it is engaged in tea cultivation. The second respondent was a worker in the M.P. Division. As per the provisions of the Plantation Labour Act, the permanent employees of the estate have been provided with residential accommodation in the estate itself as per the norms prescribed by the Act and there is no dispute in this regard. It was found that the second respondents herein had put up an additional construction called "Kutchil" appurtenant to their residential hut allocated to them by the petitioner without prior permission. They were directed to dismantle it but however in spite of the said notice the second respondents did not take any steps to dismantle the Kutchil. Consequently the petitioner vide letter, dated October 17, 1988 and December 13, 1988, issued show-cause notices as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against them. They submitted their explanations that they were put by their father-in-law and father respectively and other details. Not satisfied with the said explanation chargesheets, dated October 21, 1988 and December 17, 1988, were issued for wilful insubordination and for acts subversive of discipline. IN the domestic enquiry the management witness deposed that the second respondents herein inspite of orders, refused to dismantle the kutchil unauthorisedly constructed by them. They also examined witnesses on their behalf. The enquiry officer submitted his report holding the second respondents herein guilty of the charges levelled against them. According to the petitioner, it was not the case of the employees that since no residential accommodation has been given to them they had to construct the kutchil. Pursuant to the said reports of the enquiry officer, the petitioner vide order, dated November 21, 1988 and January 17, 1989, dismissed the second respondents from the services. Consequently they raised industrial disputes regarding their non-employment and thus I.D. Nos. 414 and 413 of 1989 came to be filed. After enquiry, the Labour Court passed the impugned awards, dated December 29, 1992, directing reinstatement of the second respondents herein with back-wages and continuity of service and other attendant benefits. IN the awards, the first respondent Labour Court held that the petitioner had not let in any evidence to show that the second respondents had put up a new construction. It also proceeded to hold that the second respondent had put up the said Kutchil only because no accommodation was provided by the petitioner and the action of the petitioner in seeking to demolish the same is not legal. Aggrieved by the said award, having no other alternative, the petitioner herein has come forward with the present writ petitions.Challenging the impugned awards it is contended by the petitioner that the Labour Court exceeded jurisdiction vested in it when it proceeded to set up special pleadings on behalf of the workman which was not even the case of the workman himself that the error apparent on the face of the record is that when there was no dispute that residential accommodation had been furnished to the workman the Labour Court proceeded to hold that because residential accommodation had not been provided to the employee he had proceeded to construct residential accommodation, and that in the domestic enquiry as well as in the claim statement there was no dispute that residential accommodation had been given to the employee. According to the petitioner, there was a specific pleading by the workman that he had been given residential accommodation and that the same was not sufficient to accommodate his family. It is their grievance that ignoring all this, the Labour Court committed an error of law when proceeding to hold that in the absence of residential accommodation provided by the employer the employee was at liberty to put up a construction on the estate. It is also contended by the petitioner-management that the Labour Court failed to see that what was in issue before the Court was whether the second respondent is justified in refusing to demolish the additional construction put up by him appurtenant to the accommodation provided to him by the petitioner and that therefore, in such circumstances, the conclusion of the Labour Court in proceeding as if the petitioner is seeking to demolish the only residential accommodation available to the second respondent and consequently holding that the action of the petitioner in trying to demolish the Kutchil is not justified is perverse and is liable to be set aside. It is also the case of the petitioner herein that the Labour Court failed to see that admittedly, the second respondent had put up an additional construction appurtenant to the accommodation provided to him by the petitioner-management. It is their categoric case that in the claim statement before the Labour Court, the second respondent has clearly admitted that the additional construction was put up only because the accommodation provided by the management was not sufficient for accommodating the family of the second respondent. Therefore it is the strong contention of the petitioner that in such circumstances, the award of the Labour Court in proceeding to hold as if that no accommodation has been provided to the second respondent and that the only accommodation put up by the employee with his hard-earned money is sought to be demolished by the management amounts to an error apparent on the face of the record and ought to be set aside. INter alia it is also contended by them that the Labour Court failed to see that as per Section 15 of the Plantation Labour Act, 1951, every employer shall provide and maintain necessary housing accommodation for every worker residing in the plantation as per the rules framed by the State Government under Section 16 of the said Act, that the Labour Court failed to see that merely because the accommodation provided by the management is not sufficient that would not empower the worker to put up unauthorised construction. It is also their case that when the facts remains that an additional construction has been put up apart from the regular accommodation provided to him by the management having been proved the Labour Court ought to have held that the employee had in spite of repeated instructions failed to demolish the construction and consequently committed a gross misconduct. They also contend that the Labour Court failed to keep in mind the consequences that would ensure if the employees who have been provided with an accommodation by petitioner-management starts putting up additional construction on the ground that the accommodation offered is not adequate. It is also their case that when the Act itself prescribes the basis for the provision of accommodation, if such acts of misconducts are allowed then the consequences would be that a large work-force would start putting up construction all over the estate and the petitioner would have no control over such constructions and the consequences would be disastrous. Therefore it is their case that for all the above reasons, the impugned awards of the Labour Court have to be set aside.Per contra, in the counter-affidavits filed by the second respondents inter alia it was contended that the Labour Court after considering the respective pleadings, the legal evidence on record including the evidence of MW-1 and WW-1 was pleased to hold that the charges are not proved and it is not necessary for the management to take disciplinary action against the respondent-workmen in as much as the Kutchil has been put up in 1951 and 1957 respectively by their father-in-law and father respectively who were also employed in the petitioner's-estate and not by this respondent. According to them, the Labour Court further found that the management has initiated action with ulterior motives to victimise this respondent for his trade union activities. Thus the second respondents herein justify the impugned awards passed by the Labour Court and according to them, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed for want of merits.