MANAGEMENT OF MADRAS ATOMIC POWER PROJECT EMPLOYEES CONSUMER CO-OPERATIVE STORES LIMITED Vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Order of the Court was as follows : Madras Atomic Power Project Employees Consumers Co-operative Stores Limited is the petitioner in both the writ petitions. W.P. No. 2050 of 1994 is directed against the proceedings of the first respondent in T.S.C. No. 21 of 1992 dated May 31, 1993 while W.P. No. 4459 of 1996 filed by the very same petitioner is against the consequential order in C.P. No. 190 of 1994 on the file of the Labour Court, Madras.THE case of the petitioner-Management is briefly stated hereunder : W.P. No. 2050 of 1994 is preferred against the order of reinstatement of the second respondent made by the first respondent in T.S.C. No. 21 of 1992 dated May 31, 1993. THE same was ordered in the appeal preferred by the second respondent against the order of termination dated July 6, 1991 made by the petitioner after having found that he misappropriated a sum of Rs. 15, 000 belonging to the petitioner. THE second respondent who was working as Assistant Manager at the Stores of the petitioner admitted his guilt before the Board of Directors took time to pay the same and gave a bearer cheque for Rs. 15, 000 on July 1, 1991. Hence, he was terminated with one month salary in lieu of notice. THE second respondent challenged the same initially by filing a suit on July 10, 1991 before the District Munsif's Court, Chingleput in O.S. No. 224 of 1991. After some time, he has filed T.S.C. No. 21 of 1992 under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Shops Act") before the first respondent. This appeal was filed on June 30, 1992 against the orders of termination dated July 6, 1991 with a delay of about one year under Sec. 41 of the Shops Act. THE first respondent entertained the appeal by condoning the delay on the ground that the appellant was pursuing his remedy in a wrong forum.

(2.) THE first respondent allowed the appeal stating that no oral enquiry was conducted so as to terminate the services of the second respondent. Against the said order, having no other effective remedy, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition on various grounds.Based on the order in T.S.C. No. 21 of 1992, the second respondent has filed C.P. No. 190 of 1994 before the Principal Labour Court, Madras claiming a sum of Rs. 93, 463.05 under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Since the petitioner-management has filed W.P. No. 2050 of 1994 challenging the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appellate Authority under the Shops Act) in T.S.C. No. 21 of 1992 dated May 31, 1993, the petitioner in W.P. No. 4459 of 1996 has prayed for issuance of mandamus for bearing the Principal Labour Court from proceeding further with the claim petition in C.P. No. 190 of 1994.THE second respondent has filed a counter-affidavit in W.P. No. 2050 of 1994 wherein it is stated that against the order of termination passed by the petitioner herein, on legal advice, he had filed an original suit before the District Munsif, Chingleput. After realising his mistake, he arranged to have the suit withdrawn and preferred an appeal under the Shops Act before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals), Madras-6. He also filed an application to condone the delay in filing the appeal explaining the reason for the delay. By the impugned order, the first respondent set aside the order dated July 6, 1991 passed by the petitioner herein dismissing him from service. Since he was not given sufficient opportunity to explain his defence, nor any charge was filed and enquiry was conducted, the first respondent herein rightly set aside the order of termination. THE order passed by the first respondent does not suffer any infirmity as claimed by the petitioner-management.in the light of the above pleadings, I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the second respondent in both cases as well as learned Government Advocate for first respondent in W.P. No. 2050 of 1994.Mr. N. Jothi, learned counsel for the petitioner-Management, after taking me through the order of termination as well as the impugned order of the appellate authority, would contend that the first respondent has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.

(3.) IN the said judgment, the Supreme Court has said 1969-II-LLJ-698 at 705 :" It is true that Sec. 61 by itself does not contain any clear indication that the Registrar cannot entertain a dispute relating to alteration of conditions of service of the employees of a registered society but the meaning given to the expression 'touching the business of the society', in our opinion, makes it very doubtful whether a dispute in respect of alteration of conditions of service can be held to be covered by this expression. Since the word "business" is equated with the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the society, and since it has been held that it would be difficult to subscribe to the proposition that whatever the society does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its object, such as laying down the conditions of service of its employees, can be said to be part of its business, it would appear that a dispute relating to conditions of service of the workmen employed by the society cannot be held to be a dispute touching the business of the society. ".14. Once this is understood that the dispute raised by the petitioners does not fall under Sec. 73(1) of the Act, for we are bound to follow the law as stated by the Supreme Court, it is obvious that the petitioners made a mistake of law in going to the Registrar or the Deputy Registrar with a petition for adjudication of the dispute under Sec. 73(1) of the Act. Since the Deputy Registrar had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, it is obvious, there was no proceeding or order from which any appeal could be preferred before the Tribunal under Sec. 96 of the Act." It is clear that the question raised by the second respondent is not one touching the constitution of the committee of the management of the society. It is also not a dispute touching the business of the society, accordingly the second respondent cannot be compelled to go before the Registrar.