(1.) As common question is involved in both the writ petitions, the writ petitions are disposed of together. The petitioner is same in both the writ petitions. The order challenged in the writ petitions are the orders passed by the second respondent in claim petitions preferred by the petitioner under Sec. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
(2.) According to the petitioner, he was dismissed from the services of the first respondent for certain alleged acts of misconduct, that the said dismissal was challenged by him in I.D. No. 204 of 1987 before the Second Additional Labour Court, Madras, and that by an award dated May 31, 1989, he was directed to be reinstated into service with all back-wages and continuity of service. It is contended that instead of complying with the award of the Second Additional Labour Court, Madras, the first respondent-management was compelling the petitioner to express consent in writing that he would forego the back-wages, that based on such a compulsion exercised by tire first respondent on the petitioner, he gave a letter dated Aug. 12, 1989, relinquishing his claim for back-wages and even thereafter since he was not reinstated, he gave a representation to the Labour Officer on Sept. 7, 1989, for the implementation of the award in I.D. No. 204 of 1987, that by the letter dated Sept. 2,1989, he withdrew his consent mentioned in the letter dated Aug. 12, 1989, that he reaffirmed the same in his further communication dated Sept. 27,1989, that in the meantime, on Sept. 11, 1989, he filed a claim petition before the second respondent, which after representation on Dec. 6, 1989, was numbered as C.P. No. 779 of 1989, that in between his signatures were obtained by the first respondent in the settlement dated Oct. 16, 1989, and in the circumstances as the settlement came into being under coercion and undue influence the same was not valid. The petitioner, therefore, contended that the subsequent order passed by the second respondent dismissing his claim in C.P. No. 779 of 1989 on the basis of the settlement dated Oct. 16, 1989, is also not valid in law.
(3.) According to the petitioner, the settlement itself was void and opposed to public policy and, therefore, the failure of the second respondent in not considering the said question would vitiate his order dated Sept. 5, 1991, made in C.P. 779 of 1989. On the above said basis, the petitioner claims that the dismissal of C.P. No. 351 of 1992 claiming wages for the period subsequent to the period covered in C.P. No. 779 of 1989 was also liable to be set aside.