RAMACHANDRAN Vs. STATE REP

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The revision petitioners are accused 1 to 4 in S.C. 231 of 1988 on the file of the Assistant Sessions Judge, South Arcot Division, Villupuram. They along with three more accused (A5 to A7) were tried in that Sessions Case for an offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. All of them, on being found guilty, were sentenced to undergo seven years rigorous imprisonment. All the convicted accused filed an appeal bearing No. C.A. 84 of 1989 before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, South Arcot Vallalar Division, Cuddalore, who, by judgment dated 31-7-1990 acquitted ail the accused. That judgment was challenged before this Court in Cr1. R.C.489 of 1990 by the victim herself and a learned Judge of this Court on 21-3-1997 set aside the judgment of acquittal referred to above and remitted the appeal for fresh disposal in accordance with law. The appeal once again went before the Principal Sessions Judge, South Arcot Vallalar Division, Cuddalore, who, by judgment dated 20-11-1997 found the accused 5 to 7 not guilty of the offence of rape, but found Accused 1 to 4 guilty of the said offence and confirmed the sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment imposed on them by the learned Trial Judge It is the correctness of that judgment that is being questioned in this revision by the convicted accused 1 to 4. Heard Mr. Shanmuga Velayutham, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners and Mr. R. Karthikeyan, learned Government Advocate on the criminal side appearing for the respondent.

(2.) The learned counsel for the revision petitioners contended that the materials available on record had not established the case of the prosecution at all as far as the offence of rape is concerned and therefore the conviction rendered by the learned trial Magistrate and affirmed by the learned Appellate Court is bad in law. The learned counsel would also submit that though the delay in giving the complaint in an offence of this type by itself will not be vital in every case, yet if other facts are established, which raises a suspicion regarding the case of the prosecution, then the delay in lodging the information shall definitely assume some importance. The circumstances that are relied upon by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners are the medical evidence totally rules out the possibility of any act of rape having been committed on the victim; the accused are not well placed in relationship with one Panneer, and Panchayat Board President; it is the dominant role of Panneer with whom the prosecution itself had admitted that the victim had an affair and the Panchayat Board President is directly responsible for the lodging of information in this case almost five or six days after the occurrence. Therefore in the presence of serious strained relationship between the accused on the one hand and the prosecution party on the other hand, since according to the prosecution, the accused did not like the victim girl carrying on all affair with the said Panneer, the delay in lodging the information must be taken as heavily loaded in favour of the accused. Viewing the first information lodged in this case in the background of the above facts, it appears that the information could not have been given by P.W.1 herself but it appears to be a creation of either Panneer all alone by himself or in a joint effort with the Panchayat Board President. P.W. is none else than the mother of the victim P.W.1. The prosecution case is that P.W. came into contact with P.W. within a reasonable time after the act of rape committed on her. If really P.W. had been raped as put forward by the prosecution, then she would not have failed to mention that aspect to her mother, namely, P.W.3, but P.W.3s evidence is totally silent on this aspect and she nowhere states that P.W.1 told her about the accused did the act of rape on her. This is yet another circumstance, according to Mr. S. Sbanmuga Velayutham, learned counsel for the revision petitioners, which shall be taken into account to doubt the very prosecution case itself. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners concluded by summing up his arguments stating that all the facts brought to the notice of this Court as noted above have not entered into the mind of the Courts below and therefore the judgment of conviction as affirmed by the Appellate Court is without application of mind to the facts noticed above, which are relevant and material facts and that would definitely vitiate the judgments.

(3.) Mr. R. Karthikeyan, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State would contend that the oral evidence of P.W. 1 that while she was on er way back home on that night, she was forcibly intercepted by A-1 is spoken by P.W-2. There is no reason at all to disbelieve the oral evidence of P.W.2 on that aspect. What happened thereafter as spoken to by the prosecution before the Court is clearly established by the oral, evidence of P.W.1. The medical evidence not disclosing any symptoms of rape on the victim by itself would not vitiate the entire prosecution since the evidence let in by the prosecution case itself, the victim girl is not a first timer but she has een used to such type of living earlier. The learned Government Advocate would also add that P.W.lTs evidence shows that immediately after committing rape, she was dipped in a stream of water and that act of the accused would have caused the disappearance of whatever evidence that would have been available on the body of victim regarding the act of rape. The learned Government Advocate also states that in a matter like this, the delay in lodging the information really does not assume importance and therefore, the delay in lodging information cannot be put against the prosecution. On the whole, it is the argument of the learned Government Advocate that the evidence is very convincing and clinching that the accused cannot escape from the conclusion of guilt so arrived at by the courts below and no ground whatsoever is made out to interfere with the concurrent Judgments of the Courts below holding the accused guilty of the offence.