SRINIVASAN Vs. SANTHANA SELVARAJ

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS Civil Revision Petition is directed against the order of the Appellate Authority under the Tamil Nadu Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act, herein after called "the Act" made in RCA No. 153/89 dated 3.11.99, rejecting the petitioners application for eviction on the ground that the claim for owner's occupation by the petitioners was not bona fide. Before reaching that conclusion, the learned Appellate Authority has also given a finding on one very vital issue viz., as to whether a subsequent purchaser of the petition premises can proceed to claim the relief claimed under the original petition by the erstwhile landlord on the ground of owner's occupation under Section 10 (3) a (iii) of the Act. In respect of the said question, the Appellate Authority by relying upon the judgment reported in S.V. Chidambara Pillai v. Subramaniam Chettiar , 1989 (2) LW 412 and Arumugha Naicker v. Baladhandayuthapani , 1998 (1) LW 616 was of the view that while the subsequent purchaser was entitled to continue with the proceedings is however bound to prove his bonafide claim for seeking eviction on the ground of owner's occupation.

(2.) THIS revision petition has been filed challenging that part of the order of the appellate authority holding that the claim of the petitioners was not bonafide. However, the learned counsel for the respondent/tenant resisted in the first instance with the very formidable objection as to the very maintainability of the appeal proceedings itself by the Appellate Authority, in view of the legal hurdle, that the subsequent purchaser cannot be construed as a person, who is eligible to claim the relief made in the original application which was peculiarly personal to the erstwhile landlord, so as to enable him to continue the appeal proceedings. The learned counsel by referring to the definition of "the Rent Controller", the provisions contained under Section 10 Sub section 2, Sub section 3. Section 14 and Section 23 of the Act contended that the consideration of the application filed under Section 10 (2) and Section 14 of the Act will stand on entirely different footing than the one filed under Section 10 ( 3) of the Act. Elaborating on that the learned counsel contended that Section 10 (2) of the Act provide for eviction of a tenant on the ground of any default being committed at his instances. While the various grounds available for eviction under Section 30 (3) of the Act related to the personal grievances of the land lord and that section 14 would come into operation with reference to any change to be carried out in respect of the very property itself. The learned counsel further contended that while an application filed for eviction under section 10(2) and 14 could possibly be continued even by the subsequent purchaser, the same will not be the case in respect of an application preferred under the provisions of Section 10 (3) of the Act.

(3.) THEREFORE, applying the said principle, to the case on hand, I find that the claim here for eviction being "peculiarly personal" to the erstwhile landlord, the present petitioners cannot be permitted to claim the very same relief though on the same ground of owner's occupation but under different cause of action altogether. It is personal because, the original application for eviction preferred by the erstwhile landlord was on the ground that he was carrying on business in jewellery in a small premises hired from a third party by paying a huge amount of rent; that his business was prospering day by day, which necessitated bigger premises; that it was impossible to get another premises without paying lakhs of rupees by way of good will which he could ill-afford. The subsequent purchaser on the other hand though are doing the same line of business of jewelry in the same town, the claim is for eviction on the ground that they wanted to shift their business from the present premises. There is no averment even in the main OP as to what is the need or necessity for shifting nor is it stated that the petition premises is not sufficient to carry on their business. There is no averment also with reference to the monetary grievance expressed by the erstwhile owner. In fact, the reasons mentioned by the erstwhile owner was not even sought to be deleted from the main petition by seeking necessary amendment. therefore, such being the major difference in the very basis of the claim made before the rent Controller, I am afraid, permitting the subsequent purchaser, to claim the relief on the basis of the original petition will only lead to incongruities. I therefore come to the conclusion that the claim of the erstwhile landlord was peculiarly personal to him alone and the subsequent purchaser cannot be stated to have acquired those circumstances by merely purchasing the petition premises. I am therefore, of the view that by applying the principle set out in Shah Dhanraj Kantilal v. Additional Judge, Court of Small Cause, Madras , 1949 (2) MLJ (SN) 26 as followed by the learned Single Judge in N. Devarajan, v. D. V. Munirathanam , 1981 (1) MLJ 97, the claim of the petitioners to maintain the original proceedings as well as the subsequent appeal cannot be sustained.