(1.) These are appeals filed on behalf of the State of Gujarat under Sec. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act read with Sec. 96. C.P.C., challenging the common judgment and awards passed by the Reference Court under Sec. 18 of the said Act We do not propose to discuss in detail the various tactual contentions which may arise in these appeals, but restrict ourselves to questions of law, which are pertinent in the context of the present order.
(2.) The principal contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is as regards the period of limitation applicable to applications for making a Reference under Sec. 18 of the said Act, and the different circumstances under which such period of limitation is to be considered and computed. During the course of hearing and discussion we have had the opportunity of referring to a number of decisions of this Court as also of the Supreme Court. During the course of hearing our attention has also been drawn to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court case of Kalidas N. Mehta and Ors. v. Stare of Gujarat and Ors., reported in 1998 (1) GLH 634 : [ 1998(2) GLR 13511 (hereinafter referred to as the said decision). It is in the context of this particular decision that we are required to pass the present order.
(3.) The said decision lays down that in order to apply the period of limitation, as provided for under Sec. 18, sub-sec. (2) of the said Act, the phrase "date of the Collector's award" must be interpreted so as to mean such date when the award is either communicated to or is known by the party, whether actually or constructively. The said decision lays down that the date of the Collector's award does not necessarily mean mere knowledge of the making or publication of the award, but also means actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the award. In paragraph 5 of the said decision, the learned Division Bench has referred to and relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court, in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, reported at AIR 1961 SC 1500, and in the case of State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum, reported at AIR 1963 SC 1604. Relying upon me said two decisions, the learned Division Bench concluded and laid down the law in para 5 of the said decision to the effect that, in the context of Sec. 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, the knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award, which must be made known to the land holder, either actually or constructively.