VIKRAMSINH PRAVINSINH RANA Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Vikramsinh Pravinsinh Rana is the petitioner in Special Criminal Application No. 282 of 1988 while Dilipsinh Pravinsinh Rana is the petitioner in Special Criminal Application No. 283 of 1988. They have been detained by two different orders passed by the District Magistrate Rajkot under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act 1985 (hereinafter to be referred to as the PASA Act) dated 8-2-1988 on the ground that they are dangerous persons and their activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. These orders of detention as well as the continued detention of these two petitioners have been challenged by filling these two petitions raising several grounds of challenge. As one of the grounds of challenge which is common in both petitions has appealed to us these two petitions are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

(2.) As we are inclined to allow these two petitions only on one ground which we shall discuss hereinafter we do not propose to go into the other grounds of challenge raised in the memos of both these petitions.

(3.) The petitioners have contended that they have been supplied the copy of the judgment delivered by the Court of Sessions Amreli in Sessions Case No. 40 of 1985 but some of the pages of the said judgment are not legible at all and therefore that amounts to non-communication of the grounds and that also adversely affected the right of the petitioners making representations to the concerned authorities. In the affidavit-in-reply the District Magistrate has stated that the copies are legible. We have ourselves looked into the copies of the judgment supplied to the detenu and we find that some of the pages are not legible at all. For example pages 16 and 42 of the said judgment are not legible. When some of the pages of the judgment are not legible that amounts to non-communication of the grounds and therefore the orders of detention and the continued detention are both vitiated. It is difficult to accept the submission of Mr. G. D. Bhatt the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor that Sec. 6 of the PASA Act can be pressed into service and the orders of detention can be sustained on other grounds. We find it difficult to agree with Mr. Bhatt that See. 6 of the PASA Act can be pressed into service in a case like the present one. Section 6 of the PASA Act comes into play only when the grounds are communicated but one or more of the grounds are found to be vague non-existent etc. When there is non-communication of some of the grounds to the detenu the question of invoking of the provisions of Sec. 6 of the PASA Act does not arise. When some of the grounds are not communicated there is violation of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India and therefore the detention becomes unconstitutional. We are supported with the view which we are inclined to take by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court rendered in (Bhimdevsinh Dilavarsinh Darbar v. State) Special Criminal Application No. 186 of 1987 (Coram: D. H. Shukla & P. M. Chauhan JJ.) on 5-8-1987. In that case also it was 8 question of non-communication of the grounds and the submission made on behalf of the State based on Sec. 6 of the PASA Act was rejected. The Division Bench of this Court referred to a judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Vhandra Sheakhar Ojha v. A. K. Karnik & Ors. reported in 1982 Cri.LJ 1642 where such a contention was raised on behalf of the State and rejected. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in that case relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kamla Kanhaiyalal Khushalani v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1981 SC 814 where the Supreme Court held that the documents and the material relied upon in the order of detention form an integral part of the grounds and must be supplied to the detenu pari passu the grounds of detention and if the documents and material are even supplied late then the detenu is deprived of an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention. The Bombay High Court observed that before the order of detention can be supported the constitutional safeguards must be strictly observed. In the case of Bhupinder Singh v. Union of India & Ors. 1987 (2) SCC 234 the detention was set aside on the ground that the right of making representation guaranteed under Art. 22 of the Constitution of India was decided.