RANJITSINH DILUBHA JADEJA Vs. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE JAMNAGAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) he petitioner has been detained as per order of detention dated 4/03/1988 passed by the District Magistrate Jamnagar on the ground that he is a dangerous person as defined under the provisions of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act 1985 (for short `the Act) and his activities as such person was (were) likely to adversely affect the maintenance of public order and therefore with a view to prevent him from indulging in such activities the detaining authority thought it fit to pass the order as stated above.

(2.) The order of detention is challenged on the ground that the statements of three persons named hereinbelow and which have been relied upon by the detaining authority are false and fictitious and these persons have as a matter of fact filed affidavit to the effect that their signatures were obtained by the police on blank paper. That three persons are Bhanji Ramji Jatubha Sodha and Kameshgiri Ochhavgiri. Therefore it is submitted that it should be held that there was no material whatsoever before the detaining authority on the basis of which subjective satisfaction as alleged could have been arrived at.

(3.) The aforesaid submission cannot be accepted for the simple reason that it is beyond the scope of judicial review under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court while exercising power under Art. 226 of Constitution of India and for that matter even the Supreme Court while exercising power under Arts. 32 and 136 of Constitution of India does not sit in appeal over the orders passed by the detaining authority and over the orders passed by the Advisory Board as well as the orders passed by the appropriate Government confirming the order of detention. This is an ingenious way to invite the Court to exercise its jurisdiction even with regard to the factual aspect of the case. Such grounds based on facts may be agitated before the Advisory Board the detaining authority and/or before the appropriate Government by way of representation. The jurisdiction of this High Court is very limited. It is essentially confined to procedural safeguards. All that is required to be seen by the High Court is as to whether the procedure adopted by the detaining authority is in accordance with the constitutional provisions contained in Art. 22 of the Constitution and in accordance with the relevant provisions of statute concerned. Similar view is taken by this High Court in the case of Smt. Manjulaben v. State reported in [1983(2)] 24(2) GLR 1505 para 23. If this Court examines the question as to whether the signatures were placed by the witnesses concerned on blank papers or after their statements were read over to them then surely this High Court will be going into the examination of correctness as or otherwise of the facts relied upon by the detaining authority. Once such steps are taken further a steps will have to be taken by the High Court as to whether the facts in the statements are correct or whether the facts stated in the affidavits are correct. Thus this Court will be doing something indirectly which it cannot do directly. In effect the submission is that the Court should exercise its powers indirectly though it cannot exercise the same directly. We are afraid we would not like to usurp the powers indirectly. Such an exercise is not only impermissible but it will also be highly improper. Therefore we cannot accept the aforesaid submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In this view of the matter we decline to examine the question as to whether the statements of aforesaid three witnesses were not recorded at all and their signatures were obtained on blank papers.