LAWS(GJH)-1978-3-8

STATE OF GUJARAT Vs. NANUSING ALIAS RANMALSING

Decided On March 09, 1978
STATE OF GUJARAT Appellant
V/S
NANUSING @ RANMALSING Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) * * * *

(2.) Thus this is a case in which complainant Babulal does not give the names of the assailants immediately after the incident when he is asked about the incident by Chunilal. Maneklal who is an eve witness goes to the village and gives information to his father but does not go to the Police station which is hardly 150 paces from his place and his father Ambalal even after an eye witness account from Maneklal does not ask him to go to the Police station to lodge the complaint and though he does not know more than four of the accused personally and is informed about the names of the other accused by Maneklal as he says reproduces all the seven names from memory including the names of the three accused not known to him when he gives evidence after a few months of the incident. He appears to have crammed the names. Chunilal who claims to arrive on the spot immediately after the incident seems to be a chance witness. The evidence of these witnesses who were examined before the learned trial Judge who had an opportunity to mark their demeanour has not inspired confidence before the learned trial Judge. In these circumstances we see no reason to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Judge.

(3.) Mr. Mehta cited before us the decision in Badri v. State of U. P. A.I.R. 1975 S. C. 1985 in support of his contention that in the instant case though the witnesses were interested or partisan witnesses in view of there being factions bitterly opposed to each other in the village it was not right on the part of the learned Judge to reject their testimony on the ground that they belong to one faction or another; and the learned trial Judge also erred in drawing an adverse inference on the ground that an independent witness namely Somabhai Naranbhai was not examined. Now so far as the ratio laid down in this decision is concerned there cannot be any dispute. But the same as it applies to the facts in the case before the Supreme Court cannot be applied to the facts of the case with which we are dealing because each case has to be decided on its own facts. The facts in the instant case are distinguishable from the facts of the case with which the Supreme Court was dealing. In the instant case it was because of the infirmities in the evidence of the partisan witnesses as pointed out earlier that the evidence was rejected by the learned Judge and not solely because they were partisan witnesses. We have also assessed the evidence of these witnesses on its own merits and then come to the conclusion that the evidence does not deserve to be accepted.