BAI JADAV Vs. DURLABH RANCHHOD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition is directed against an order dated 24 June 1966 passed by the State Government under sec. 88D sub- sec. (1) clause (iv) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act) cancelling with effect from the date of the said order a certificate of exemption granted to the petitionery under sec. 88C in respect of four survey numbers namely 505/4 260 260 and 708 situate in village Sajod Taluka Ankleshwar District Broach. The said four survey numbers belong to the petitioner and respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are tenants of the petitioner in respect of the said four survey numbers. The petitioner claiming that the sa-d four survey numbers did not exceed an economic holding and the total annual income of the petitioner including the rent of the said four survey numbers did not exceed Rs. 1500.00 applied to the Mamlatdar for a certificate of exemption under sec. 88C and the Mamlatdar on being satisfied that the petitioner was eligible to the exemption provided in sec. 88C granted a certificate dated 20th September 1958 that the petitioner was entitled to exemption under sec. 88C in respect of the said four survey numbers. The petitioner thereafter on the strength of the certificate of exemption gave a notice and made an application for possession of survey Nos. 260/1 260 and 708 from respondents Nos. 1 and 2 under sec. 32T on the ground that he bona fide required the said three survey numbers for cultivating the same personally. The Mamlatdar by an order dated 7th August 1962 held that the petitioner required the said three survey numbers bona fide for personal cultivation and directed respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to hand over possession of the said three survey numbers to the petitioner. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 being aggrieved by the order for possession preferred an appeal to the Prant Officer and the main contention taken up by them in the appeal was that the notice of the application was not served upon them and they had therefore no intimation of the date of hearing of the application before the Mamlatdar. This contention prevailed with the Prant Officer and the appeal was allowed and the case was remanded to the Mamlatdar for retrial. The Prant Officer however gave a direction that the Mamlatdar should take up the case for hearing only after the appeal preferred by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 against the order granting the certificate of exemption was disposed of and the order deciding the appeal was received by him. This direction of the Prant Officer was obviously misconceived since respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had not preferred any appeal against the order granting the certificate of exemption and there was accordingly no question of waiting for the disposal of the appeal. But the proceeding taken by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 was an application to the State Government for cancellation of the certificate of exemption under sec. 88C. The Mamlatdar therefore decided not to proceed with the hearing of the inquiry until this application was disposed of by the State Government.

(2.) Now the application made by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to the State Government under sec. 88D was a written application dated 2nd July 1963 and the ground on which they moved the State Government to cancel the certificate of exemption was that the income of the petitioner had exceeded Rs. 1500.00 per year. The State Government directed the Collector to hold an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether the income of the petitioner had exceeded Rs. 1500.00 per year and the Collector after an inordinate delay of about two and a half years issued a show cause notice dated 21st December 1965 calling upon the petitioner to show cause why the certificate of exemption should not be cancelled under sec. 88D sub-sec. (1) clause (iv) on the ground that her annual income appeared to be in excess of Rs. 1500.00 and intimated to the petitioner that she might remain present at 2-00 P.M. on 3rd January 1966 at the Collectorate with all available evidence. The petitioner accordingly appeared at the Collectorate and her statement was ultimately recorded by the Mamlatdar on or about 20th February 1966. Beyond recording the statement of the petitioner no other witness was examined before the Mamlatdar nor was any other inquiry held by him in the presence of the petitioner. The petitioner also did not receive any notice from the State Government intimating what was the material on the basis of which It was alleged that her annual income had exceeded Rs. 1500.00 and giving her an opportunity to after her explanation in regard to such material. The State Government without giving any further intimation to the petitioner proceeded to pass an order dated 24th June 1966 under sec. 88D sub-sec. (1) clause (iv) cancelling the certificate of exemption granted to the petitioner in respect of the said four survey numbers. No intimation of this order was also given to the petitioner but the petitioner came to learn about it from an order passed by the Collector on 18th August 1966 that her application for possession under sec. 32T would proceed according to law before the Mamlatdar since the exemption certificate bad been cancelled by the State Government. The petitioner thereupon filed the present petition challenging the validity of the order of the State Government under sec. 88D sub-sec. (1) clause (iv).

(3.) The only ground on which the impugned order was challenged was that it was passed by the State Government without complying with the principles of natural justice. Now sec. 88D sub-sec. (1) does not provide in express terms that the principles of natural justice shall be followed by the State Government before making an order under that section and the requirement of observance of the principles of natural justice can therefore be imported only if the function discharged by the State Government can be regarded as a quasi-judicial function. It is now well settled that compliance with the principles of natural justice is a necessary attribute or incident of quasi-judicial function: it follows as a necessary corollary from the duty to act judicially which is an essential characteristic of quasi-judicial function. The first question which therefore arises for consideration is whether the function discharged by the State Government in making an order under sec. 88D is a quasi-judicial function. Now so far as this question is concerned there is a decision of my learned brother Bakshi J. sitting as a Single Judge given on 19/20th March 1968 in Special Civil Applications Nos. 901 of 1963 and 835 of 1963 (Ganibhai v. State J G.L.R. 274) where on a full and elaborate consideration of the nature of the function discharged by the State Government under sec. 88D and its effect on the right of property of the landlord the view has been taken that the function performed by the State Government under sec. 88D is a quasi-judicial function. Since the date of this decision this view has been consistently followed in this Court and no reasons have been adduced before us which would persuade us to take a contrary view. We find ourselves wholly in agreement with the reasons which prevailed with my learned brother Bakshi J. and we do not consider it necessary to rehearse the same reasons over again. The State Government is clearly under a duty to act judicially in making an order under sec. 88D and the function discharged by the State Government must be held to be a quasi-judicial function. If that be so it is incontrovertible that the State Government must comply with the principles of natural justice in making an order under sec. 88D.