TESTEELS LTD Vs. N M DESAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Reference raises a very important question in the field of administrative law. The question is whether an administrative officer discharging quasi-judicial functions is bound to give reasons in support of the order he makes. Is it required of him that he should make a speaking older ? The question arises in reference to an order made by the conciliation officer under sec. 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 A conciliation proceeding vas pending before the conciliation officer in regard to an industrial dispute between the petitioner and its workmen. During the pendency of the conciliation proceeding the petitioner discharged the second respondent who was one of the workmen employed in the factory of the petitioner after following the procedure prescribed by the Standing Orders. The discharge was for misconduct not connected with the industrial dispute pending before the concilation officer and it was therefore necessary for the petitioner under the proviso to sec. 33(2)(b) to make an application to the conciliation officer for approval of the action taken by it. The petitioner accordingly made an application to the conciliation officer for approval of the order of discharge passed by the petitioner. The second respondent to whom notice of the application was issued contested the application on grounds which it is not necessary to mention for the purpose of the present decision. The conciliation officer by an order contained in a letter dated 6th March 1964 intimated to the petitioner that its action regarding discharge of the second respondent was not approved. Beyond stating that the action of discharge of the second respondent was not approved the order did not give any reasons why the conciliation officer bad decided not to approve petitioners action of discharging the second respondent. The petitioner was aggrieved by the order made by the conciliation officer and it accordingly filed the present petition challenging the validity of the said order.

(2.) The petition originally came up for hearing befor a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Bakshi and Thakor JJ. At the hearing before the Division Bench five contentions were raised on behalf of the petitioner challenging the validity of the impugned order. of them the first four contentions are material for the purpose of the present reference. The first contention was that the conciliation officer acting under sec. 33(2)(b) exercises quasi-judicial functions; the second contention was that the conciliation officer while so acting is a tribunal within the meaning of Articles 136 and 227 of the Constitution; the third contention was that even if the conciliation officer is not a tribunal he is still amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and the fourth contention was that since the conciliation officer is exercising quasi-judicial functions and is amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 22b he is bound to make a speaking order or in other words he must give reasons in support of the order he makes. The Division Bench after hearing the advocates appearing on behalf of the parties came to the conclusion relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Lakshmi (hand and others A.I.R. 1963 S. C. 677 that the conciliation officer acting under sec. 33(2)(b) is under a duty to act judicially and his decision is therefore a quasi-judicial and not an administrative decision and he is accordingly amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 2 6 but he is not a tribunal within the meaning of Articles 136 and 227. Disposing of thus the first three contentions the Division Bench then proceeded to consider the fourth contention. Two decisions of two different Division Benches of this High Court were cited before the Division Bench on behalf of the respondents in support of the contention thats quasi-judicial authority is not bound to give reasons in support of Its order and that the order is not vitiated by absence of reasons supporting it. One was a decision of a Division Bench consisting of J. M. Shelat C.J. as he then was and myself in Pirbhai v. B. R. Manepatil VI G.L.R. 554 The challenge in that case was against the determination of the Collector under sec. 31 of the Bombay Stamp Act 1958 and the decision of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority under sec. 53(2) of that Act. One of the grounds of challenge was that the determination of the Collector as also the decision of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority were both quasi-judicial decisions and since neither of these two decisions was supported by any reasons both these decisions were invalid. This ground of challenge was negatived by the Division Bench on the view that the functions discharged by the Collector and the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority were administrative and not quasi-judicial and therefore the premise on which the necessity for giving reasons was sought to be Imported was lacking But the Division Bench also proceeded to observe in a judgment given by me on behalf of the Division Bench:

(3.) There are two strong and cogent reasons why we must insist that every quasi-judicial order must disclose reasons in support of it. The necessity of giving reasons flows as a necessary corrolary from the rule of law which constitutes one of the basic principles of our constitutional set-up. Our Constitution posits a welfare State in which every citizen must have justice-social economic and political and in order to achieve the ideal of welfare State the State has to perform several functions involving acts of interferences with the free and unrestricted exercise of private rights. The State is called upon to regulate and control the social and economic life of the citizen in order to establish socio-economic structure. The State has therefore necessarily to entrust diverse functions to administrative authorities which involve making of orders and decisions and performance of acts affecting the rights of individual members of the public. In exercise of some of these functions the administrative authorities are required to act judicially. Now what is involved in a judicial process is well-settled and as pointed out by Shah J. in Jaswant Sugar Mills case (supra) a quasi-judicial decision involves the following three elements: