(1.) 1. RULE. Mr. Oza learned Assistant Government Pleader waives service of rule on behalf of the respondent No. 1 and Mr. Dave, learned counsel waives service of rule on behalf of respondent No. 4, mainly contesting party and in view of the order passed by this Court, hereinafter presence of District Development Office may not be required since the order may not be adverse to him.
(2.) ONLY question to be considered in the present case is that whether the Additional Development Commissioner has committed error apparent on the face of the record in not further remanding the matter to the District Development Officer after setting aside the order passed by the District Development Officer or not ?
(3.) THE short facts of the case appears to be that as the criminal case was filed against the concerned private respondent No. 4, the District Development Officer had initiated action under Section 59 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act (herein after referred to as the "act" ). It was found by the District Development Officer that the criminal case is pending pertaining to moral turpitude against the concerned respondent in one case, who was Sarpanch and in other case, who was Deputy Sarpanch. Therefore, ultimately, District Development Officer suspended the concerned private respondent as Sarpanch and Deputy Sarpanch as the case may be by passing separate order, both dated 25. 7. 2008. It appears that private respondent concerned carried the matter before the Additional Development Commissioner by preferring appeal under Section 59 (3) of the Act. The Additional Development Commissioner in the appeal did observe that three reported decisions of this Court, are not considered and merely because the Criminal Case is filed against the person concerned, itself may not be sufficient per se, to exercise power of suspension, but it would be required for concerned Authority to examine as to whether there is prima facie involvement and as to whether such case can be said relevant to moral turpitude or not. It was recorded by the Additional Development Commissioner that the aforesaid inquiry, as required, was not undertaken by the District Development Officer and therefore, he allowed the revision and set aside the order of District Development Officer. The pertinent aspect is that he did not remand the matter to the District Development Officer for reconsideration. It is under these circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court by preferring present petition.