DIPAKBHAI R PATEL Vs. D D O

JUDGEMENT

(1.) AT the outset, it is to be noted that all these Special Civil Applications preferred by the petitioners have common identical question and the subject matter to be decided by this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and, with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, they are heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. Arguments advanced and submissions made by learned counsel Mrs. Ketty A. Mehta have been adopted by all other learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in the cognate matters. Even the nature, tenure and terms of appointment and other service conditions of the petitioners under a project of the scheme framed by the Union of India in collaboration with the State Government are also same and none of the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners has disputed this aspect.

(2.) THE genesis of the rehearing of all these petitions has in the order dated 30th March 1998 passed by the Apex Court in Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal [civil] Nos. 5516-5532 of 1998, which reads as under:

(3.) THE above Special Leave Petitions were preferred by the petitioners herein against the Oral Judgment dated 26th December 1997 delivered by the Division Bench of this Court [coram: C. K. Thakker [as His Lordship then was] and R. P. Dholakia, JJ. ] in Special Civil Application No. 1499 of 1987 and cognate matters, whereby, all the writ petitions came to be dismissed ant the claim of the petitioners, who were appointed temporarily on the respective posts under Scheme for regularization and permanent absorption and for 'equal pay for equal work' came to be negatived. However, in view of the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioners before the Apex Court that the petitioners were employed under 'non-Formal Education Scheme' which continued to operate and the timings of the employment were regular and while dismissing the Special Leave Petitions, the Apex Court permitted the petitioners to file an application for review. Thus, the grounds and principles on which the Special Civil Application No. 1499 of 198 and allied matters were dismissed, were not disturbed by the Apex Court.