CHAUHAN CHIMANSINH BHARATSINH Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard learned counsel for the parties.

(2.) The petitioner No. 1 was appointed under the order dated 16th June 1980 of respondent No. 2 on work charge and temporary basis. The petitioners No. 2 to 5 were appointed on different dates in the year 1980-81, but their subsequent appointments and extensions were made by common order. This appointment of petitioners was continued till 15th October, 1980. Then the petitioners were again given appointment on work charge temporary basis on 15th June 1981 by respondent No. 2 which lasted till 15th October, 1981. So there is a gap of about eight months in between first and second appointment. Third time, the petitioners were given appointment under the order dated 16th June, 1982 of respondent No. 2 and it has also come to an end on 15th October, 1982. So once again there is a gap of eight months in between second and third appointment. Then the petitioners were given appointment for the period from 16th June, 1983 to 15th October, 1983 on the work charge temporary basis. This time, the term of appointment was extended till 28th February, 1984. So it is a case of temporary appointment for fixed term and it comes to an end any afflux of time. It is true that after 28th February, 1984, the petitioners were continued in service on the basis of fixed term appointments given for 29 days and their services came to be terminated under the order dated 2nd December, 1985, but the fact remains that all the appointments were only on work charge temporary basis for a fixed term, which does not confer any right upon the petitioners to continue to hold the posts.

(3.) It is a settled law that a temporary government servant does not become permanent unless he/she acquires that capacity by force of any Rule or is declared as permanent servant. Reference in this respect may have to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam vs. Devendra Kumar & Ors., reported in JT 1995 (1) SC 198. The Division Bench of this Court (Coram : B.N. Kirpal, C.J. (as he then was) & H.L. Gokhale, J.), in the case of Bhanmati Tapubhai Muliya vs. State of Gujarat, reported in 1995 (2) GLH 228, has held that the temporary appointment which has been made for a fixed term comes to an end by afflux of time. In such cases, even the order of termination is not required to be made. It is also a case where the petitioners were appointed, as stated earlier, only on work charge temporary basis for fixed term and that appointment comes to an end automatically. The petitioners have no right to continue in the employment on the basis of their temporary appointment. Much emphasis has been laid on the ground that the petitioners have completed 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding the date of termination of their services, and as such, compliance of provisions under Sec. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, should have been made. It is suffice to say that it is a case of fixed term temporary appointment and the term of appointment has come to an end by afflux of time. Moreover, the matter pertains to the services in the Government Department and as such the recruitment and other service conditions are being regulated either under the Rules framed under Art. 309 or Art. 162 of the Constitution and as such, the service conditions are regulated under the Rules. Moreover it is a question of fact whether the petitioners have completed 240 days or not. Last but not least, if the petitioners are claiming benefits of provisions of Sec. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, then the appropriate course for the petitioners would have been to approach Labour Court and not this Court, but they have chosen to approach this Court and as such, the validity of the order of termination has to be considered with reference to the provisions under the Constitution of India and with reference to legal rights. As stated earliar, a temporary Government servant does not acquire any right to hold the post and as such none of the legal and fundamental rights of the petitioners are infringed.