(1.) xxx xxx xxx.
(2.) It is settled that High Court exercising powers under Article 226 has limited jurisdiction to interfere with the quantum of punishment. Normally, it will not be open for this Court to interfere with the punishment inflicted by the departmental authorities. However, if the Court finds that the decision of the competent authority on the quantum of punishment is arbitrary or utterly perverse, it will open for this Court to interfere.
(3.) In the present case, the petitioner was holding the post of General Manager. He was required to discharge multifarious duties. It is not in dispute that the Account Department of the mill which processed the alleged fictitious medical bills was headed by Chief Accounts Officer, It is not in dispute that the bills were fully verified to be genuine and correct by the Chief Accounts Officer and only thereafter they were sent for sanction to the petitioner. The petitioner in his capacity as General Manager was only required to consider for sanction of the bills. There is nothing to show that the petitioner was in any way a party to the fictitious bills or he had acted with any ulterior motive or in any case his integrity was otherwise doubtful. I am not at all impressed by the observation of the Appellate Authority when it is said that if the General Manager would have taken a little care, he could have found the vouchers in fictitious names as the vouchers were of stereo nature, In my view, the approach of the Appellate Authority is erroneous. The bills were verified by the Accounts Department and the petitioner in his capacity of General Manager was only to consider for grant of sanction as executive head. The petitioner was discharging multifarious duties, and as such it would be too much to expect that he will check every bill more particularly its genuineness aspect. Thus, in my view, the fault of the petitioner is not of that magnitude which calls for the penalty of dismissal. The view taken by the respondent-authority is not only arbitrary but also utterly perverse. On the conspectus of the facts, I am satisfied that the penalty of dismissal is not commensurate with the magnitude of the fault. The ends of justice would meet if the penalty of dismissal is substituted by penalty of stoppage of three increments.