AMRITBHAI GHELABHAI PATEL Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution the present three petitioners who are convicts undergoing sentences of imprisonment in the Ahmedabad Central prison have made a grievance that the periods spent by them for industrial training between 21-10-1984 and 18-5-1985 is not being counted by the respondents jail authorities towards remission of sentence. The petitioners case is that in the year 1984 the jail authorities had decided to start a new industry section of steel furniture in the Central Prison at Ahmedabad. They decided to send some prisoners for training outside the jail. The jail superintendent had thereafter called some 65 to 70 prisoners to find out their consent. All these prisoners were ready to undergo the training. Therefore the jail authorities had asked for police opinion in cases of all the said prisoners. During this period the jail authorities had consulted Gujarat Khadi Gramodyog Mandal having its office opposite Gandhi Ashram Sabarmati Ahmedabad and after consultation the Manager of the said Mandal agreed to give the training in steel furniture section to the prisoners in his institution. The petitioners state that the police opinions in their cases were in their favour and the jail authorities had granted them parole for one month on 16-10-1984 and all the prisoners were released on parole on 20-10-1984 with the special condition to start with the training in the above institution. As per this condition the petitioners joined the institution on 21-10-1984 for training. It is their further case that while releasing them on parole the jail authorities had taken their undertaking in writing that they would take this training without asking for wages they will obey the jail rules and they will bear all the expenses of their lodging and boarding. It is their further case that the Manager of the Gujarat Khadi Gramodyog Mandal had opined that the petitioners had to undergo this training for one composite year. Hence on submitting their application for extension the jail authorities had extended their parole period as and when they submitted their applications. Thus in all there were 210 days parole leave. Because of some incidents in the city of Ahmedabad full training course could not be completed and therefore parole leave of the petitioners were not extended and hence they surrendered on 19-5-1985. It is the submission of the learnd advocate for the petitioners that the entire period during which they were released on parole for joining this training should be counted for remission in their sentences. They are tempted to make this submission on the ground that they had to report themselves early in the morning in the said institution for taking training. The training hours were between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. They were not allowed to go out without the prior permission of the Manager. Moreover the jail superintendent or jailor or the Inspector General of Prisons visited the office to check up. the activities in the institution. The petitioners therefore contend that they were not free agents though they were on parole leave. It is on this basis that it is submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioners that the entire period of 210 days should be treated to have been spent by the petitioners as if in open jail and if the period is treated as such the petitioners can be said to have served out the sentence during this period and this period would be available to them for remission.

(2.) The learned advocate for the respondents on the other hand submitted that the petitioners themselves by their own choice decided to go for industrial training. They were free agents who willingly agreed to go out of jail premises for getting this training and during the entire period they were treated to be released on parole and their parole applications were moved from time to time by them as per requirements of the parole rules and thus parole was extended from time to time to enable the petitioners to get full training. Unfortunately full training could not be completed. Therefore the project for having steel furniture workshop in the jail premises did not go through. If it had gone through the petitioners would have equipped themselves with the art of manufacturing steel furniture. This would have been a permanent asset to the petitioners and even if they had fully served out the sentence they would have gone in the open world backed up with this expertise. That asset would naturally have remained during the rest of their earning career. Their earning prospects outside were to be boosted up because of the training and that is how the petitioners had opted for this training. It was submitted that under the relevant provisions of the Prison Furlough and Parole Rules there are only two modes in which convict undergoing sentence of imprisonment can be permitted to go out of the jail before he serves out the actual sentence. One way is to release him on furlough and the second is to release him on parole. The question of granting furlough does not arise. 210 days was the period during which the petitioners were permitted to go out of the jail on parole. If they had received full training their expertise would have been available to the jail authorities during the time they remained in jail but that would have also enabled the petitioners to earn required wages at higher rate as compared to the wages available to manual workers who are convicts and who are undergoing imprisonment. It was therefore submitted that it is not as if that this training was merely one sided affair and was only for. the benefit of the Government. It was more for the benefit of the concerned prisoners who of their own will agreed to go out of jail on parole. It was submitted that as per Rule 20 of the concerned rules the period spent on parole cannot be counted as remission in sentence and therefore the request made in the present case cannot be countenanced.

(3.) We find considerable force in the contention of the learned advocate for the respondents. On the facts of this case it is clear that the concerned petitioners were released on parole on their own request and that parole period was extended from time to time to enable them to take industrial training at Gujarat Khadi Gramodyog Mandal office at Gandhi Ashram Sabarmati Ahmedabad. It is not as if that during that time they were under any imprisonment. They were clearly on parole. They were permitted to even eke out their livelihood after training hours by pursuing any source of employment during the time they were on parole. They were allowed to go and reside with the members of their family during the time they were on parole. Only because the training if completed would have been useful to the Government as the petitioners expertise could have been utilised in preparation of steel furniture would not make the petitioners training period as actually sent in jail or even in open jail as submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioners. The counsel for the petitioners fairly stated that the petitioners had agreed to be released on parole for getting this training as they were likely to get out of four walls of the jail. Be that as it may it cannot be said that the petitioners went out of jail on parole contrary to their own desire. It is also interesting to note that if this training had been successfully completed the petitioners could have obtained expertise which would have stood as an asset in their later life even after they were released from imprisonment. Consequently it cannot be said that the petitioners had continued in jail custody during the time they were released on parole for getting industrial training. Merely because higher authorities used to visit the training centre would not make training centre an open jail for the petitioners as tried to be contended by the learned advocate for the petitioners. Consequently it must be held that the period during which the petitioners were released on parole to enable them to take industrial training cannot be considered to be period spent in jail custody. Moment that finding is reached the result is obvious. Mandate of Rule 20 starts operating. As this period spent on parole is to be treated as such it cannot be counted as remission in sentence as laid down by Rule 20. Under these circumstances the request of the petitioners that the said period should be treated as period of imprisonment and in that case they should be granted remission due to them during that period cannot be accepted. Prayers (a) and (b) in the petition cannot survive and will have to be rejected.