LAWS(GJH)-1987-4-4

RAMANBHAI NAVSUBHAI KUKANA Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT

Decided On April 02, 1987
RAMANBHAI NAVSUBHAI KUKANA Appellant
V/S
STATE OF GUJARAT Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The learned advocate for the appellant further submitted that even assuming that the accused had given a push from the bridge the appellant cannot be convicted for the offence punishable under sec. 3(92 of the Indian Penal Code because the case of the accused would not fall within the provisions of sec. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. He submitted that in this case the evidence on record shows that there was no intention on the part of the accused to cause death of the deceased and therefore it would not fall within the first part of sec. 300 It is his say that the accused and deceased were quarreling for a petty amount of Rs. 5.00 which was given by the Contractor for taking tea to all the labourers.

(2.) In this case as the death of one person has been caused by the act of the accused hence the question which is required to be considered is whether the act of the accused falls within the definition of culpable homicide not amounting to murder or the higher offence murder itself. As stated above the death has actually been caused by criminal act of the accused by giving push to the deceased from the bridge. Since it is not accidental or suicidal death responsibility for the homicide in absence of any exceptions or extenuating circumstances as per sec. 300 of the Indian Penal Code must be borne by the person who has caused it. This question is required to be decided by taking into consideration the four clauses of sec. 300 of the Indian Penal Code which are as under:

(3.) It would not also within the second clause of sec. 300. The second clause deals with acts done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom harm is caused. The mental attitude is two-fold- (1) the intention to cause such bodily injury and (2) there is the subjective knowledge that the death will be the likely consequence of the intended injury. From the evidence on record it cannot be said that the accused had an intention of causing particular bodily injury which he was knowing to be likely to cause death because the accused had given the push from the bridge 2nd that h: was not knowing that by this push the internal injury No. 2 would be caused and the deceased would die of the said injury i. e. it cannot be said that the accused had caused that very injury intentionally.