ARVINDKUMAR CHANDULAL PATHAK Vs. KRISHNAKANT JAGMOHANDAS MAJMUDAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Mr. V. B. Patel who appears on behalf of the petitioner has raised before me the following four contentions:

(2.) I have gone through the judgment of the Tribunal. It appears to me that the Tribunal has laboured under the impression that it has no jurisdiction to grant any relief to the petitioner because Grant in Aid Code conferred no rights upon the members of the teaching staff and that they were merely administrative instructions to govern relationship between the secondary schools on one hand and the Government on the other hand. In that behalf reliance has been placed by the Tribunal on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ku. Regina v. St. Aloysius Higher Elementary School. A.I.R 1971 S. C. 1920. It has been laid down in that decision that Grant in Aid Code confers no enforceable rights upon the members of the staff. It appears to me that with the enactment of sub- sec. (2) of sec. 40 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act. 1972 the position has changed and what could not be done by a Court of Law earlier can now be done by the Tribunal. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 40 provides as under:

(3.) Mr. C. K. Patel who appears on behalf of respondent No. 1 has contended before me that in the instant case the jurisdiction which the Tribunal can exercise is the jurisdiction of a civil court and no more. In that context again he has brought into play the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Reginas case (supra). In my view after having exhausted the remedies provided under the Grant in Aid Code of moving a hierarchy of educational authorities if a teacher whose services have been terminated approaches a civil court what he really prays for is that refusal on the part of the educational authorities to interfere with the order of termination made by the management was bad. It is therefore open to him to challenge the decision of the educational authorities as well as to seek reinstatement. The civil court exercising the plenary jurisdiction could entertain both these prayers. Therefore if the civil court had the jurisdiction to examine the legality of the order made by the educational authorities the Secondary Education Tribunal to whom the suit was transferred necessarily had that jurisdiction. In my opinion it is not correct to say that the civil court did not have such a jurisdiction and that therefore the Secondary Education Tribunal had no such jurisdiction. The educational authorities could have examined the contentions which have been raised by Mr. Patel and could have interfered if they had substance in them. They could have been raised before the civil court . Therefore they could be raised before the Secondary Education Tribunal also.[The rest of the judgment is not material for reports. ]