V C SHROFF Vs. GUJARAT ELECTRICITY BOARD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two petitions are directed against the common respondent the Gujarat Electricity Board hereinafter referred to as the Board. The petitioner in the former petition is one V.C. Shroff who was at the time of his premature retirement an Executive Engineer in the Selection Grade under the Board. The petitioner in the latter petition is one P. J. Pandya who too was an Executive Engineer under the Board in the Selection Grade. Both these petitioners were made to retire compulsorily on the completion of the 55th year of their life. In these two petitions each petitioner challenges the said order of premature retirement essentially on the ground that the order is passed in violation of the mandatory provisions of Regulation No. 72 framed by the Board in exercise of statutory authority vested in it. On the other hand the respondent Board has tried to support the orders in question by urging that the orders are within the strict framework of the said Regulation no. 72. The only question therefore that arises for our determination in these two petitions heard together with the concurrence of both the learned advocates for the two petitioners in two separate petitions and the counsel for the Board is whether the impugned orders are in contravention of the provisions of Regulation no. 72 of the Board.

(2.) Before we deal with this question a preliminary objection raised in both these petitions on behalf of the Board deserves to be dealt with. After the impugned orders had come to be passed both these petitioners had collected from the Board the amounts of gratuity that was available to them. The Board therefore contended that after having taken the orders lying down and accepted the resultant benefit of gratuity without any demur the present petitions are barred under the principles of acquies cence though Mr. Patel did not like to adopt this particular technical phrase and he therefore urged that because of the acceptance of the orders by availing themselves of the amount of gratuity they were estopped from challenging the very orders. We find little merit in this preliminary objection because the principle of estoppel arises if and only if the other side is because of the representation made to alter its position to its disadvantage. By paying the gratuity the Board has not materially altered its position. The question of acquiescence also does not arise. In these circumstances it would be reasonable to infer that the petitioners who have without much loss of time approached this court by filing the present petitions had accepted the amounts of gratuity with reservations and without any intention to acquiesce in and accept finally the orders of premature retirement.

(3.) In order to have the clear picture of the controversy Regulation No. 72 as amended with effect from 11-12-75 deserves to be quoted verbatim :