UKADBHAI VALLABHBHAI HALPATI Vs. NAVRANG TRANSPORT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Revision Application is directed against an order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Surat rejecting an application made by the petitioners for condoning the delay in presenting application for compensation under sec. 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The application in question was not rejected on merits but on a technical ground namely that since it was sent by registered post and not presented in person or by a recognised agent or by a pleader appearing applying or acting on behalf of the petitioners the application was not tenable.

(2.) In reaching the aforesaid conclusion the Tribunal adopted the following reasoning: (1) that under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 110-C and Rule 294 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules 1959 thereinafter referred to as the Rules) the Tribunal has the powers of a Civil Court and it is competent to exercise such powers in so far as the same are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the Rules; (2) that so far as entertainment of an application for condonation of delay was concerned no specific rule was framed; (3) that Rule 291 which related only to the main application for compensation was not applicable; (4) that under the circumstances Rule 310 was attracted and accordingly the Tribunal was required to follow the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code for the trial of suits; (5) that under Order 3 Rule I.C.P.C. any application in or to any Court; required or authorised by law to be made in such Court except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force was required to be made by the party in person or by his recognized agent for by a pleader appearing applying or acting on his behalf and (6) that therefore it was incumbent on the petitioners to have presented the application for condonation of delay either in person or through a recognized agent or pleader and that since the petitioners instead of adopting such a course had sent the application by registered post the application must be treated as having not been validly presented. The question is whether this view of the Tribunal which is based upon interpretation of the relevant provisions of law is correct for if it is not by an erroneous view of the legal provisions the Tribunal has refused to exercise jurisdiction which vested in it.

(3.) Now it appears to me that the Tribunal fell into an error in treating the application for condonation of delay as an application unconnected with the application for compensation and in treating it as a substantive proceedings and on the basis of that reasoning in holding that Rule 291 was not applicable and that what applied was Rule 310. in this connection it requires to be noted that under sec. 110A (2) every application for compensation has to be made to the Tribunal having juris- diction over the area in which the accident occurred and it is required to be made in such form and to contain such particulars as may be prescribed. Rule 291(1) provides that an application for compensation arising out accident of the nature specified in sub-sec (1) of sec. 110 by persons specified in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 110A made to the Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred shall be in form Comp. A to the Rules and shall contain the particulars specified in that form. The prescribed form Comp. A prescribes the various particulars which the applicant has to furnish and one of the particulars which is required to be furnished is the grounds for not making claim for compensation within the prescribed time limit from the date of the accident. This particular is to be furnished in column 14 in the prescribed form. It would thus appear that the grounds for not making an application in the prescribed time are to be set out in the application itself and under the proviso to sub-sec. (3) of sec. 110A the Tribunal may entertain the application after the prescribed time limit if it is satisfied on the basis of the grounds disclosed as aforesaid that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. It would thus appear that the only requirement of law is that the grounds for not preferring an application for compensation within time have to be stated in the body of the application itself. It is under these circumstances that no provision has been made for filing and entertaining a separate application for condonation of delay. Even if a party has made such a separate application it will have to be treated as a part and parcel of the main application and the grounds set out in such application will have to be read as having been furnished in the application in column 14 of the prescribed form. Once this legal position is appreciated it will become clear that the only Rule which can apply in the circumstances such as are present in this case is Rule 291(2). The said Rule inter alia provides that every application for compensation made under sub-rule (1) shall be sent to the Tribunal or to the Chairman in case the Tribunal consists of more than one member by registered post or may be presented to such member of the staff of the Tribunal as the Tribunal or as the case may be the Chairman may authorise for the purposes. The presentation to the Tribunal of an application which has as its accompaniment a document which sets out the grounds for condonation of delay and which document has to be treated as a part and parcel of the main application itself can therefore be validly made by registered post and no such application can he rejected on the ground that the law requires it to be presented in person or through a recognized agent or a pleader