(1.) The applicants in this revision application are the heirs and legal representatives of the original defendant Ismailbhai Mohmmadbhai. That defendant was sued in the Court of the Joint Civil Judge Junior Division Nadiad by the present opponents who were the plaintiffs of that Suit for eviction from the suit premises in which that defendant was their tenant. Out of the several grounds on which eviction was sought one ground which alone is now relevant was that the landlords required the premises reasonably and bona fide for their own occupation. The trial Court by its judgment dated 11th February 1963 found that case made out and having further held that greater hardship would be caused by refusing to pass a decree than by passing it it gave the landlords a decree for eviction. The original defendant went in appeal to the District Court at Nadiad. Pending the appeal the original defendant died and his heirs and legal representatives were brought on record. Now the premises in suit are admittedly business premises and it was held by this Court on 22-4-63 in Parubai v. Baldevdas (V G.L.R. 563) that on a true construction of sec 5(11)(c) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) that section does not apply to premises which were used by the tenant as business premises and on the death of a statutory tenant in respect of business premises the statutory tenancy would come to an end and neither the heirs nor the members of the family of the statutory tenant would be entitled to resist the landlords claim for recovery of possession. When the appeal before the District Court came up for hearing this decision was brought to the learned Judges notice and the learned appellate Judge held following this decision that the heirs and legal representatives of the defendant were not entitled to resist the claim for possession. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed and against that order this revision has been filed.
(2.) Before I set out the submissions of Mr. R. M. Shah the learned advocate appearing for the applicants in support of the revision application it is appropriate to notice the change in the Act which has taken place after the appeal was decided and while the revision application to this Court was pending. Clause (1) of sec. 5 of the Act defines the expression tenant as meaning any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any permises and then follows the inclusive part of the definition made up of four sub-clauses. Sub-clause (a) refers to certain the tenant in the premises has been transferred sub-clause (b) refers to certain persons remaining in possession after the determination of the lease and sub-clause (c) which is material reads as under :-
(3.) The submissions made by Mr. R. M. Shah the learned advocate of the applicants may now be stated. His first submission was that this Courts decision in Parubais case which was the decision of a Single Judge had not considered the provisions of the law correctly and he invited me to disagree with that decision and hold that the protection of sec. 5(11)(c) of the Act as it originally stood did extend also to business premises and to refer the matter to a Division Bench. His next submission was that if I was not inclined to accept that submission even then the decision does not come in his way in view of the amendment in the law made by the Gujarat Act 18 of 1965 while this revision application was pending in this Court. His argument on that part of his submission was two-fold. One was that the amendment was in fact retrospective by its language and intendment and gave a retrospective protection to tenants of business premises and the members of their family carrying on business with the tenants in the premises at the time of the death of the tenants and therefore the applicants here if they prove that they satisfied the conditions laid down in the amended provision cannot be evicted. He desired that for that purpose the matter should be remanded back to enable the applicants to prove by evidence that they satisfied the conditions laid down in the amended provision. His other argument was that even if the amended provision is not held to have retrospective operation by its language or necessary intendment even then under a rule of construction of statutes the amendment must relate back to the date of the original Act and therefore the amendment must be deemed to have been there all along and the Act must be read as if it always contained this amended provision. In support of this last proposition he relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Parvati v. Shridhar (60 Bom. L R 1165)