NARPATSING MANSANG PARMAR Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By the present revision application, the petitioner has sought to challenge the order dated 22.7.1999 of the learned Addl.Sessions Judge, dismissing his application for discharge in Special Case No.24/94 in which charge -sheet for the offences punishable under sections 7, 13 (1)(d) and 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act') was filed. The petitioner had applied for discharge on the ground that previous sanction required under the provisions of section 19 of the Act was not granted by the officer competent to remove him from service since the authority appointing him was District Development Officer whereas the sanction was granted by Dy. Development Officer. The petitioner relied, in the trial court as well as in this court, upon the judgment of this Court dated 7.7.1998 in Criminal Revision Application No.513/97, wherein it was not disputed that the cadre of Talati - cum -Mantri was a district cadre and the disciplinary authority competent to impose penalty upon Talati -cum -Mantri was District Development Officer. Learned counsel Mr Buddhabhatti further argued that, in the facts of the present case, the petitioner happened to be Talati -cum -Mantri appointed by the order dated 24.9.1979 of the Dy. District Development Officer but he was in the district cadre.

(2.) Learned APP, Mr Sudhanshu S. Patel relied upon the order granting sanction in the present case and the provisions of Rules of 1967 and the circular dated 16.8.1966 whereby the Dy.District Development Officer was empowered to appoint Secretaries of Panchayats, as mentioned in the impugned order of the trial court. Learned APP also relied upon the later judgment in Laljibhai Shivshanker Trivedi v. State of Gujarat (2001 (3) GLR 2033) wherein it is held that the Dy.District Development Officer has concurrent powers of appointment and removal of Talati -cum - Mantri, by a fiction of law. The learned APP also relied upon the provisions of sub -section (3) of section 19 of the Act whereunder irregularities if any, in the grant of sanction could not be pressed into service for reversing an order unless, in the opinion of the Court, failure of justice had, in fact, been occasioned thereby. He submitted that no failure of justice was even contended by the petitioner. He also pointed out that under the said provisions, the proceedings ought not to have been stayed, but because of the stay of the proceedings in the year 1999 and subsequent passage of time, the present proceedings may have occasioned failure of justice.

(3.) In view of the above facts and submissions, and in absence of rules and circulars relied upon by the trial court in the impugned order, it has to be believed and held that the Dy. District Development Officer was empowered and authorised to sanction prosecution under the provisions of section 19 of the Act. If that be so, the present revision application was wholly misconceived and not maintainable.